Questions for the moral atheist

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Your response is borderline gibberish, for lack of keyboard discipline. Try again, if you can.

OK how about this:

You: I guess the rub would be the insertion of a new concept. With the theist, the thought/behavior/action which is in accord with God is called good. Not sure how to express that as an actual formula, but something along the lines of:

You: "Truth = good and if t = Truth, then t = good"

Me: I would have thought you'd say "In accord with God = good and if t = in accord with God then t = good."

You: For the atheist, the thought/behavior/action which is in accord with flourishing is called good, or:

You: "Flourishing = good and if t = Flourishing, then t = good"

You: So the formulas appear the same, but the distinction comes with the designation of the term 'good.' We think of God as good because a person (Him) said so. He had to call Himself something, so let's not quibble about the value just yet.

Me: Then nor shall we accept it just yet.

You: But we the good that we attribute to flourishing is attributed by us--- we give it that value. That might not be a problem, but we'll see. Upon what is our valuation of good based? Given that life is accidental, has no purpose, cannot be prolonged for any significant amount of time, is headed toward certain destruction and will leave no source of help or history, what makes flourishing good? Is there any good at all, really?

Me: I'd say the good we attribute to being in accord with God is attributed by us. there being no evidence that it is so, other than the writings of man.

Me: if the good of flourishing is negated only by those things you mention like life being accidental, this in fact only reinforces the good of flourishing. You can say what is the good of flourishing if we net out at zero, but we can reply, let's flourish while we can, anyway, and leave behind a flourishing society, if we can. Flourishing is good, even if it's not forever.

You: Back to the theist, who at least appears to have somewhat of an objective, i.e., outside of his own measurements, standard of the term good--- not matter how it is constituted in his own mind.

Me: I don't think it has that appearance in the least. It's projection.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]It seems to me that Aquinas specifies that some objects of knowledge come to be known by means other than reason, that means being faith, which is revealed to the intellect by God's grace.

There have been claims on here before (not saying that you are making the claim) that faith and revelation are somehow valid epistemic—or at least cogniti ...[text shortened]... t of reason, but is inherently rational--and so needs no mysterious other cognitive category).[/b]

Maybe someone can summarize the progress that was made in this thread before the hijacking, and get it back on track from that point.

Originally posted by JS357
Maybe someone can summarize the progress that was made in this thread before the hijacking, and get it back on track from that point.

Wow! Go away for a little while and all kinds of stuff happens. I probably should have suggested we take this elsewhere earlier. Sorry.

I'll post my reply, when it's ready, as a new thread. I've been pretty busy at work today (and this weekend isn't looking much freer), but I'll try to get something going sometime this weekend, for anybody who's interested.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Freaky, thank you. But Bennett is the professional philosopher. I am what you call a hack.

Don't sell yourself short. I wish our current graduate students thought and wrote as clearly as you do.

Originally posted by black beetle
Oh well; you asked “…If moral norms are just norms to which we've collectively agreed, then what explains the agreement? Are these norms right because we've agreed to them, or did we agree to them because they're right?”…

I replied that in my opinion, as regards your main concern, we have nothing but Piaget’s schemata that take a specific form out of ...[text shortened]... Aquinas’ core theology at its best is complete bonkers, I wish him heartily good luck
😵

Yes, we think what we think, and our views regarding morality are our views, and all this results from our deliberative judgments, and these are informed by the interaction of our nature and that which we perceive. But this doesn't settle anything regarding, or even really address, the role of consensual agreement in morality, or whether an instrumentalist view of practical rationality is at the bottom of morality, or whether there are substantive constraints on what we can rationally will, or whether there are moral facts that are objective (i.e., that obtain regardless of our idiosyncratic beliefs or desires), or... I just don't see the relevance of your metaphysical speculations on ethical or metaethical issues.

Originally posted by bbarr
Yes, we think what we think, and our views regarding morality are our views, and all this results from our deliberative judgments, and these are informed by the interaction of our nature and that which we perceive. But this doesn't settle anything regarding, or even really address, the role of consensual agreement in morality, or whether an inst ...[text shortened]... st don't see the relevance of your metaphysical speculations on ethical or metaethical issues.

Methinks it does settle down the role of consensual agreement in morality: since we think what we think, as you accurately pointed out, some of us think the same thing about a specific matter and thus they establish a consensus, some of us do not and thus they disagree, and so on. At the bottom of each invention of ours, say morality, the sole thing I see is (the) mind (behind that invention; and thus I see That Mind as a product of that invention whenever that invention evolves further. This is what I mean when I propose that we are products of our products; how exactly and by which means this string of thought was evaluated by you as "metaphysical speculations on ethical or metaethical issues", is something I would really like to know whenever you 'll find some time to explain it to me).

Now, is the substratum an instrumentalist view of practical rationality? Maybe, maybe not, I reply. You have to be specific and brink forth a specific issue, and then we can evaluate whether this is really the case or not. But anyway, it will still be Us, because the substratum itself (regarless of the result of our analysis) is still located in the mind (thus inside us, therefore it does not exist neither somewhere out there separated from us the way our Freaky thinks, neither can it be evaluated as objective) and nowhere else.

Finally, you ask if there are moral facts that are objective… I just said that in my opinion objectivity is non existent. Everything we perceive is filtered by our mind alone, and then we decide, say, to code in general our consensus (with a specific society, team, religion, sect, philosophical system, you name it) as “right” etc., as I said earlier. So once more, where exactly did you notice “metaphysical speculations on ethical or metaethical issues"?
😵

Originally posted by JS357
My daily rumination:

OK so I have correctly identified the most relevant source materials from Aquinas, generally speaking the Summa and also, specifically, certain sections of the Commentary on John. Now I wonder if this additional work will help pyx further. I do have one comment for you at the end.

Your statement, "This way, he hopes to establish as f ...[text shortened]... since any supposed knowledge not arrived at by reason is arrived at by, or as, faith.

I agree with vistesd in full🙂

The fact that Aquinas and those who follow his lead would see no problem with my objection, does not turn “faith” and “revelation” into valid epistemic and/ or cognitive means.
But let's enjoy this discussion at the next to come thread from our pyxelated: our Freaky is right, puir thread is hijacked😵

Originally posted by JS357
Maybe someone can summarize the progress that was made in this thread before the hijacking, and get it back on track from that point.

Our Freaky is still looking (as regards morality amongst else) for "Meaning" that is located “somewhere” out of his own mind, a specific yet poorly defined “somewhere” that is revealed when one “pierces the ceiling into transcendence”.
This quest is attacked by many, and from different perspectives. It seems to me our Freaky cannot advance the thesis of the OP😵

Originally posted by black beetle
Our Freaky is still looking (as regards morality amongst else) for "Meaning" that is located “somewhere” out of his own mind, a specific yet poorly defined “somewhere” that is revealed when one “pierces the ceiling into transcendence”.
This quest is attacked by many, and from different perspectives. It seems to me our Freaky cannot advance the thesis of the OP😵

The thesis of the OP has to be inferred from it, since all the OP does is pose questions to the non-theist. Rhetorical questions, perhaps, as it turns out.

So, is anyone planning to continue advancing any thesis on this thread? Just remember not to hijack it.

Originally posted by JS357
The thesis of the OP has to be inferred from it, since all the OP does is pose questions to the non-theist. Rhetorical questions, perhaps, as it turns out.

So, is anyone planning to continue advancing any thesis on this thread? Just remember not to hijack it.

Please don’t be bent out of shape about the “hijacking” comment. First of all, most threads tend to run off on various tangents, as various of us wing in with this or that relevant but tangential thought—sometimes three or four separate sub-threads start to run. I have hijacked many a thread that way, so no comment about that on my part should be taken as accusatory. But, I always think that the person that started the thread ought to be given some respect when they ask that any tangential sub-threads be continued elsewhere. Others disagree.

I think it was the whole Aquinas discussion, which I weighed in on (simplistically) before I saw Freaky’s request. Aquinas, of course, may be taken as an example of the futility on the part of theists when they think they have provided some grounding—outside reason and empiricism, by invoking faith or revelation or a supernatural category—for ethics that is superior to anything the non-theist can have. And in that case, it is not tangential at all. But as a discussion on Aquinas—or the particular view that he represents (the quick of which I was trying to cut to)—can become a tangent sub-thread; Freaky saw it so, and at that point, I think it’s fair to move that discussion elsewhere. As I say, others disagree; and I am not the arbiter of thread propriety. And maybe I'm just wrong.

Look, I enjoy your thoughtful posts. If I offended you in any way, I apologize. It was not intended.

________________________________________

EDIT: Over the years, "hijack" has become almost a technical term on here. Like threads that are titled "Calling out [name of person]"--they might be just to ask a question; they are not taken as a "call out" in the challenge sense. Similarly, "hijack" does not (or at least it did not for some time) imply any mal-intention. I'm probably not expressing myself wll at all, so I'll just shut up now.

Originally posted by black beetle
Methinks it does settle down the role of consensual agreement in morality: since we think what we think, as you accurately pointed out, some of us think the same thing about a specific matter and thus they establish a consensus, some of us do not and thus they disagree, and so on. At the bottom of each invention of ours, say morality, the sole thing I s ...[text shortened]... re exactly did you notice “metaphysical speculations on ethical or metaethical issues"?
😵

To call morality an invention as opposed to calling it, say, a discovery about how to get along together, is already to have opted for a horn of the Euthyphro dilemma. Again, the worries here (as applied to social contract accounts of morality), are: (1) that if our agreement regarding some set of norms is based upon reasons (e.g., that we will have some desire satisfied by adherence to the norm, or that we think it would be good, or right for people to adhere to the norm), then it is those reasons that are ultimately explanatory of the normativity of morality, not the mere fact that we agree, and (2) that the traditional accounts of the practical reason that inform social contract theories are either instrumentalist (i.e., means-end reasoning, where imperatives are conditional upon some given motivation), which typically leads to a form of egoism, or substantive, like Kant's (i.e., where there are imperatives that are categorical, and are based on the very nature of the will, or conditions for autonomous willing), which are typically too thin to give us the breadth of norms we take to be constitutive of morality.

All your "products of products" talk I find mysterious, and my bet is that, when you unpack it in clear prose, it will end up both trivially true and irrelevant to both ethical and metaethical questions. My bet is that you think you're making an interesting point against the objectivity of morality, as though we are construing objectivity as requiring mind-independence. But that's not how moral philosophers construe objectivity. Everybody thinks that morality has something to do with what we deeply care about, and what we take ourselves to have reason to do. If our nature was different, if our minds were different, the moral norms that applied to us would be different as well (Unless you're Kant, who thought that The Categorical Imperative applied to all rational agents, just by virtue of their being rational, but even Kant would admit that abiding by The Categorical Imperative would look different amongst creatures with radically different given ends). The notion of objectivity at issue has to do with the relation between the truth-conditions of moral judgments and the beliefs and desires of agents. Suppose, for instance, that the Aristotelians are right: We should do what virtue recommends, and virtues are forms of excellence in character, and character traits are excellent iff they reliably conduce to, and are partially constitutive of, human flourishing. Suppose, further, that an individual can simply be mistaken about what a flourishing human life is like. It will then follow that this fellow could simply be mistaken about the moral norms that apply to him. And if one person can be mistaken, then so could a culture, or every person party to a social contract. There is a sense, then, in which moral norms could be both mind-dependent (since part of human flourishing will involve our mental life, and what we deeply care about, etc.), and yet not simply a matter of what any person or collective happens to believe or desire. Morality may be objective in this sense, and nothing you've said is relevant to this notion of objectivity. You are applying some dualistic conception of objectivity/subjectivity; as though there is an sich objective reality on one hand, and subjective perceptions on the other, and anything that gets filtered through us falls out on the subjective side. If that's the way you draw the map, then morality will end up subjective. But that's a really boring and trivial point. Yes, morality has something to do with subjects of experience, and its content will be based on facts about subjects, their lives, their minds, their vulnerabilities, their conceptions of the good, etc. But, so what? That doesn't answer, or even address, any of the interesting questions about the facts that make moral claims true or false, the relation of these facts to individuals or collectives, the relation of these facts to our shared nature or idiosyncratic ends, the relation of these facts to constraints on practical rationality, etc. It's as if some epistemologists were examining the objectivity of judgments about color, and you pipe in "Wait, without minds there would be no color! So color judgments are not objective!" O.K., but that's banal, and not the notion of objectivity epistemologists care about.

Originally posted by vistesd
Please don’t be bent out of shape about the “hijacking” comment. First of all, most threads tend to run off on various tangents, as various of us wing in with this or that relevant but tangential thought—sometimes three or four separate sub-threads start to run. I have hijacked many a thread that way, so no comment about that on my part should be taken as ...[text shortened]... -intention. I'm probably not expressing myself wll at all, so I'll just shut up now.

You always express yourself quite well and I look forward to your posts. My response to the hijack comment was to indicate that I was about done with that subthread, and that is true. Now it seems that the thread has nowhere to go.

Elsewhere, I think not on any RHP forum, I have used the word hijack in the context of morality and religion in an intentionally provocative way; saying that religion hijacked morality. So I can't object to your use of the word.

Originally posted by bbarr
To call morality an invention as opposed to calling it, say, a discovery about how to get along together, is already to have opted for a horn of the Euthyphro dilemma. Again, the worries here (as applied to social contract accounts of morality), are: (1) that if our agreement regarding some set of norms is based upon reasons (e.g., that we will have some desi ...[text shortened]... ., but that's banal, and not the notion of objectivity epistemologists care about.

Edit: "To call morality an invention as opposed to calling it, say, a discovery about how to get along together, is already to have opted for a horn of the Euthyphro dilemma."

I doubt that. "Discovery" of what exactly? Is really morality a discovery (of something "objective" out there that exists in separation from our own mind) about "how to get along together", or is it a rational way we made up (invented) in order to "get along together"? Morality to me is just another mapping. And mapping is whatever we invent for our convenience when we decode into apprehension, hence into "Meaning:, whatever we perceive/think. Therefore I opt for neither horn of the Euthypro dilemma. In fact, Euthypro dilemma (and the Platonist approach in general) does not touch me.


Edit: "Again, the worries… …of morality."

I see! Perhaps we could check it all out once more from another perspective: since "morality" is arising de facto in almost all human actions, a morally significant distinction is anyway drawn between doing something and letting something happen. Is this view also "metaphysical speculation" or banal, or is it a description of an event? Or is it an attempt of mapping a fact? I have the feeling it is merely a subjective projection of one’s mind: I can kill someone, or let him live, or let him die. How the (caused after my action alone, and thanks solely to my action) evaluation of Yours as regards My action, can turn My factual and specific moral judgment into an objectively answerable independent moral fact the way you conceive and judge it? If your evaluation cannot do it (and I argue that it cannot), then the moral judgments (yours included, regardless of your theory of morality) lack of truth values, hence they lack of inherent existence, therefore they are empty. I can be so banal all the way down!
That being said, I don’t wish to enter a debate about the semantics of conditional statements. That is, I don’t care to examine if it is possible to draw a distinction between counterfactual and indicative conditionals as you appear to imply, because at the present time this would be pure noise to me, for my main and sole concern at this thread is (the evaluation of the mind that leads to) the evaluation of morality. I mean, since the indicative conditionals too lack truth conditions and truth values, as pure products of the mind they are also empty –and, thus, once more I dismiss our Freaky’s thesis.
So methinks that:
1. since the logics of these two different conditionals have close similarities although the required analysis of counterfactuals is different than that of the indicative conditionals, and
2. since one can well assert a corresponding counterfactual instead of asserting an indicative conditional,
then mind alone is always projecting itself and its products and again itself ad infinitum (morality and all other empty inventions, all the new ideas and discoveries and theories of reality based on previous ones and so on) instead of projecting, as our Freaky claims based on Aquinas’ theology, a so called "objective truth that comes from G-d and it is achieved by faith and revelation". So, once again, It’s only Us: we are the products of our products;


Edit: "All your "products of products" talk I find mysterious, and my bet is that, when you unpack it in clear prose, it will end up both trivially true and irrelevant to both ethical and metaethical questions."

I am not this strong in English, but how much clearer prose am I supposed to offer you?! I 'm sure you are perfectly versed as regards Popper’s Three Worlds (World 1: the Physical world of physical objects, events and biological entities; World 2: the world of mental objects and events; World 3: the world of Ideas, hence the products of thought). Through the interaction of the Three Worlds, we are the products of our products. It all ends up so trivially true and quite relevant to both ethical and metaethical questions.


Edit: "My bet is that you think you're making an interesting point against the objectivity of morality, as though we are construing objectivity as requiring mind-independence. But that's not how moral philosophers construe objectivity.”

I just argue that their "objectivity" is not objectivity at all. As a constructivist, I argue that, in this context, moral philosophers’ "objectivity" is just a conventional term used by them for their convenience; this notion is as conventional as our consensus to call a "tree" a tree. Indeed, to me it is clear that their theories are not objective per se but purely subjective.


Edit: "Everybody thinks… …ends)."

Sure thing;


Edit: "The notion… …to this notion of objectivity."

I 'm not an Aristotlean. In fact, when I analyze their theory of reality, I cannot extract even the slightest indication that virtue exists the way they hypothesize (I cannot see how virtue exists separated from our own mind, that is), since there is no way to prove that an 1:1 mapping between their supposition and the factual reality we perceive is existent. I dismiss all theories that are unveiled on the basis of a priori beliefs, and I am not adopting any theory of reality based on speculation that has to be accepted as if it was factual. So, first show me how exactly and by what means the Aristotlean virtue can be existent somewhere out of our own mind, and then I will evaluate your theory.


Edit: "You are applying some dualistic conception of objectivity/subjectivity"

No. In fact I simply reject the dualistic approach of "objectivity/subjectivity". I am not a dualist and I argue that every theory of reality is purely subjective. Objectivity to me is a delusion.


Edit: "as though… …of the good, etc."

No. That so called "Objective Reality" of yours is in my opinion a delusion too, because we can neither perceive Reality holistically, nor generalize it so that all the sentient beings have the same perception about it. The sentient beings perceive fractals of the Unique Reality of the (epiontic) observer Universe that surrounds us, trying to create "Meaning" during their struggle to embrace Chaos. Your reality will be ad infinitum different than dolphins’ or ants’ reality, and these three different realities will be ad infinitum all as real as it gets (to the cognitive apparatus of these three different sentient beings respectively). In my opinion, each perception of reality of each sentient being, is strictly related to its cognitive apparatus alone. This is the reason why I 'm talking about a Unique Reality (not about an Objective Reality) that is in fact partly perceived and understood differently by each different sentient being.


Edit: "But, so… … rationality, etc."

Sure thing! As I told you earlier, I don’t care to elaborate on these matters. I leave the moral philosophers to enjoy their Noise –me, I enjoy my Silence. I go beyond Noise, because all that matters to me is the nature of my self, not my products per se.


Edit: “It's as if some epistemologists were examining the objectivity of judgments about color, and you pipe in "Wait, without minds there would be no color! So color judgments are not objective!"

No. It’s as if some epistemologists were examining the nature of judgments about colour, and they pipe in "Wait, the red colour we are observing is objectively true regardless of the conditions that cause the existence of its redness”. However, redness is existent solely to the observers with a cognitive apparatus capable of decoding this colour under specific circumstances. Again, I see nothing objective per se as regards redness.


Edit: "O.K., but that's banal, and not the notion of objectivity epistemologists care about."

Maybe it’s as banal to you as intellectualism is Noise to me! However, the notion of objectivity epistemologists care about, has nothing to do with the way I perceive objectivity. Moral philosophers’ kind of "objectivity" is not really objectivity, but a subjective notion they are using in a quite specific context for their convenience. Words are Empty.
😵

Originally posted by bbarr
Don't sell yourself short. I wish our current graduate students thought and wrote as clearly as you do.

I meant to comment on both your and LJ's responses, and I am certainly with you on this one: LJ's concision and disciplined concentration speak of anything but a hack. Whether formal training or recreational leisure is the cause is of little import, as the result for readers such as myself, you and others is enrichment.

Although acrimony is better than no feelings at all (ha!), I certainly had taken no long-standing offense at any disagreements no matter how sharply presented by either side. Neither do I consider any of the atheistic stripe inherently bad, per se. Conceding your collective surpassing intellect, I nonetheless contend that atheists are simply misguided.

Originally posted by black beetle
I leave the moral philosophers to enjoy their Noise –me, I enjoy my Silence.

O.K., see you later!