16 Aug 11
Originally posted by black beetleYou may have over-thought the question. Try another run at the OP and limit the thinking to the lines drawn there.
Edit: "Why ought?"
Methinks the sole thing that "makes something good/ bad" is the evaluation of the mind.
Instead of favoring theoretical reflection over praxis and devoting your mind to solving metaphysical problems with the assumption that the atheist need these problems to be solved in order to live a meaningful/ moral life, you could simply try ...[text shortened]... e of your religion, to me sounds unsound.
As usually, I ended up with my black coffee😵
16 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHI thought I made clear that in my opinion
You may have over-thought the question. Try another run at the OP and limit the thinking to the lines drawn there.
• a moral value is always a product of the mind
• “objective moral values” are non existent; “objectivity” can be nothing more than our collective subjectivity
• my moral standard is empty (a product of the mind) and subjective in full. What makes your moral standard more than a subjective opinion or personal preference? What makes it truly binding or obligatory? Why can't it simply be ignored when it is also evaluated as just another thesis?
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16 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHHere's what is missing in the atheist's puzzle. He is okay with man flourishing, but can't give him any compelling reason to do so... other than to say that he ought to."
You make it sound easier than I anticipated.
[b]Why/how is following God's commands or aligning with God's will any better than not doing such things?
Here's what is missing in the atheist's puzzle. He is okay with man flourishing, but can't give him any compelling reason to do so... other than to say that he ought to. Presumably, he could make s ...[text shortened]... is is how my challenged brain sees things. Maybe you could clear things up for me.[/b]
I'll stick with "flourishing" as the topic. What I see is that the atheist who thinks about it recognizes that morality works best when it is based on a central value to which the members of a society all (or almost all) can aspire through cooperation. This does not make that central value an objective truth of the type "flourishing is good." It makes it a situation of broad intersubjective agreement that, "Yes, we all want to flourish," around which which "oughts" can be developed. And they develop before there is leisure time to sit around and philosophize. They develop during the cooperative hunting and gathering, and later the wheat harvesting and goat tending and defense against thievery and mugging once the concept of property is established as being conducive to flourishing. "We all want to flourish and this requires restraining ourselves and others from stealing the neighbor's (or the communal) supply of wheat. So it is good for flourishing, not to steal. The "for flourishing" can be deleted.
If this isn't transcendant enough for you; that is just the way it is. But if your existence is thereby rendered pointless, and you become a danger or a drag on your fellows, there is a remedy.
Just in case such disappointment might leads people to ignore the oughts of their society, societies have ways to reinforce them; to give people a way to flourish anyway. One way is to instill in you from an early age, a divine source, with any needed carrots and sticks for the most in need. So of course theists will come to exist, and they will argue that atheistic explanations of morality are hollow. That's religion doing its job, for those people who find it comforting. I guess the net effect of religion has generally been conducive to flourishing, with exceptions in place and time, or it would wither away. Which it does, in some societies.
16 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHThe bedrock for the theist is pretty straightforward: that which is good derives its value from a person who defines good.
You make it sound easier than I anticipated.
[b]Why/how is following God's commands or aligning with God's will any better than not doing such things?
Here's what is missing in the atheist's puzzle. He is okay with man flourishing, but can't give him any compelling reason to do so... other than to say that he ought to. Presumably, he could make s ...[text shortened]... is is how my challenged brain sees things. Maybe you could clear things up for me.[/b]
Just how is this a satisfactory explanatory resolution? You just said that what is at issue is ultimate explication of what makes something good. You acted like the theist is in some better explanatory position in this regard than the atheist. But now you're telling me that the theist's recourse is to the idea that God simply makes stuff good through some sort of mysterious divine fiat. I fail to see how that offers any genuine explanatory power at all. Nor do I think this answer is "straightforward". There are a host of problems related to this horn of the Euthyphro.
The bedrock for the atheist is not so distinct. He calls something good if it helps man flourish, and then turns around and says flourishing is good... because it helps man. Of course, this is how my challenged brain sees things. Maybe you could clear things up for me.
Perhaps it is not clear what I meant by bedrock. It seems like you are requiring some underlying support for the atheist's normative bedrock. But the whole point of bedrock here is that bedrock is what underlies; there is no underlying it. This should not be so mysterious, since you have a normative bedrock as well that functions in a structurally similar way. It would not matter if the atheist simply says that flourishing is good because that is just the way it is; or that it is simply a brute moral fact. He is still no worse off or better off than yourself.
16 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHWell, if the theist isn't really concerned with morality, then I'm not sure why we're having this conversation. I was under the impression that theists who advocate things like Divine Command Theory, Natural Law Theory, Virtue Ethics, etc., were explicitly concerned with morality, since they are taking the time to articulate theories of morality. If morality "doesn't really require God", then I guess we actually agree!
I'm getting your point about the distinctions between normative and descriptive claims and I see how there at least appears to be a symmetry between the jumps made by theists and the non-affiliated. Not to quibble too small a point, I think it is worthy noting, however, that theism isn't overly concerned with morals, per se, because he views morals as oug ...[text shortened]... verlap of convergence be considered a normative claim derived from descriptive claims?
But I would take issue with your two apparent claims above, that (1) it is a moral norm that we treat others as we'd wish to be treated, and (2) that something like a social contract underlies morality. Regarding (1), the "Golden Rule", Kant did a pretty thorough job of demolishing that norm. First, it doesn't correctly apply to those who have idiosyncratic desires regarding their own treatment. If the misanthropic hermit desires no help from others, the Golden Rule seems to give him license to ignore others in distress. But that's just callousness, and callousness is typically wrong. Regarding (2), I have the same concerns about Social Contract Theories that I do theistic ethics; that they end up falling prey to Euthyphro dilemmas. If moral norms are just norms to which we've collectively agreed, then what explains the agreement? Are these norms right because we've agreed to them, or did we agree to them because they're right? On the neo-Hobbesian versions, it's rational self-interest that explains the agreement. On the neo-Kantian versions, it's putative norms of practical rationality. In either case, the normativity of moral norms is derived from the normativity of rationality. But the neo-Hobbesian accounts end up forms of egoism (e.g., one has no reason to comply to the norms if one is sufficiently good at free-riding and avoiding punishment). And the neo-Kantian versions typically end up impoverished, since simple consistency in willing, or the requirement that one agree to norms to which other, similarly situated rational agents could also agree, is too thin to ultimately explain our very robust moral practices.
And, as I mentioned above, the question "But is X good?" has to stop somewhere. For the secular ethicist, it stops when normative bedrock is reached; when we trace back and explain our considered moral judgments by reference to some basic set or normative concepts. I think that the basic concepts regard human flourishing and virtue. So, when asked "Why is flourishing good?", or "Why is virtue good?", my response is that these are intrinsically good; that our concept 'Good', when unpacked, and our usage of it examined, is best explained by positing that human flourishing and virtuous character are bedrock, and function as moral foundations. Of course somebody can disagree. But I don't think it is a requirement on a moral theory being correct that there be the resources to convince a skeptic or sociopath. Those people you just want to avoid, and perhaps lament that they were poorly raised, or psychologically damaged.
17 Aug 11
1 edit
Let me take a break right here and say something probably uncharacteristic of me otherwise. I fully understand the wide gap between LJ, bbarr (and others herein who have offered their slants on the opposing side) and me, the ill-equipped theist. But I have to tell you, despite our contentions otherwise, I find myself exceedingly grateful for a chance to have these types of conversations at this level with folks who have clearly accomplished something worthy of note.
I play competitive basketball on a regular basis with a bunch of other equally medium-level skilled players. From time to time, in walks any number of highly skilled professional or college players from the area who grace us with their game. It's like watching a trained martial artist at work, playing against them. And, it's like losing to a trained martial artist, playing against them. Their every movement planned and prepared for, nothing left to surprise them: it's an honor and a treat to see it in action, even if they wax us 18-0.
That's akin to what it is to have professionals such as LJ and bbarr. Their obvious levels of skill, discipline and mastery are truly a joy to behold and I am thankful for the instructive nature of their dialogue as well as their humility in allowing folks like me to pick their brains.
I just wanted to express my gratitude for your indulgence and let you both know it is appreciated. Hope that didn't sound too over the top. Now let's get back to the fisticuffs.
17 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHI'm in total agreement with you on this point Freaky. This thread has turned out to be one of the most informative and interesting that I've ever followed in the spirituality forum, thanks particularly to bbarr's comprehensive and lucid contributions.
Let me take a break right here and say something probably uncharacteristic of me otherwise. I fully understand the wide gap between LJ, bbarr (and others herein who have offered their slants on the opposing side) and me, the ill-equipped theist. But I have to tell you, despite our contentions otherwise, I find myself exceedingly grateful for a chance to ...[text shortened]... reciated. Hope that didn't sound too over the top. Now let's get back to the fisticuffs.
17 Aug 11
Originally posted by bbarrEdit: "If moral norms are just norms to which we've collectively agreed, then what explains the agreement? Are these norms right because we've agreed to them, or did we agree to them because they're right?"
Well, if the theist isn't really concerned with morality, then I'm not sure why we're having this conversation. I was under the impression that theists who advocate things like Divine Command Theory, Natural Law Theory, Virtue Ethics, etc., were explicitly concerned with morality, since they are taking the time to articulate theories of morality. If morality ...[text shortened]... erhaps lament that they were poorly raised, or psychologically damaged.
The agreement is explained out of our consensus, consensus being just a product of the evaluation of the mind. And we agree to them because (we evaluated that) they promote our well being; then we agree to identify them as “right”, and then these norms are identified by us out of the blue as “right” because we ‘ve agreed with them –here you are: we are nothing but the products of our products.
As regards morality, I have the feeling our works are related to the removing of the obstacles that are limiting the pleasure (the way we respectively perceive it) we are extracting from Life. You appear willing to name “rational self-interest” the agent that explains that agreement, or “practical rationality”, but methinks we can advance well beyond these theories. We do it because We Want to Do it, and you ask “Why?”... Why are we drinking when we are thirsty?
I fail to see why this is not the sole cornerstone of our “very robust moral practices” (that, to me, is as empty as our moral practices per se). It’s only Us, and we are the products of our products; who are You? Methinks this is the point where the variations starting from the question “But is X good?” come to a halt.
If this is indeed the sole cornerstone, and if this is really the end point, I cannot see how these accounts end up forms of either egoism, or impoverished systems of evaluation of the mind. If there is indeed Something to be found, you have to find it on your own
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17 Aug 11
Originally posted by LemonJelloBut now you're telling me that the theist's recourse is to the idea that God simply makes stuff good through some sort of mysterious divine fiat.
The bedrock for the theist is pretty straightforward: that which is good derives its value from a person who defines good.
Just how is this a satisfactory explanatory resolution? You just said that what is at issue is ultimate explication of what makes something good. You acted like the theist is in some better explanatory position in this regard ...[text shortened]... hat it is simply a brute moral fact. He is still no worse off or better off than yourself.[/b]
I don't know that it's all that mysterious, really. The Bible says He spoke it into existence, which seems nearly too simple to most thinking. However, when one considers that man follows a similar path, i.e., making plans, visualizing the results and etc., speaking things into existence ceases to be that much of a stretch. Think about the many, many times you've thought or called me an idiot. The results speaks for themselves, I'd say.
And, I will contend that I didn't say God makes good stuff. I don't know that we got to that point, really. Let's just say that God makes all stuff, that without God no stuff exists (for the theist's argument) and leave valuation for later. Thinking of things in the former sense doesn't qualify the good with any objective standard, whereas the latter allows for valuation based upon further development/investigation. Walking into it, we really don't have anything that makes 'good' meaningful, since we have nothing to compare it to.
I did contend that because God makes all stuff, and moreover, because He made angels and man with a capacity to enjoy the purpose of life, i.e., joy, happiness and love, failure to follow the formula results in pain and suffering.
There are a host of problems related to this horn of the Euthyphro.
If we view god-like behavior as the standard, and un-god-like behavior as the failure, perhaps the dilemma is solved. For instance, God cannot lie because He is truth. Truth, therefore, is the god-like behavior and lying the un-god-like behavior. Anyone with similar capacities who in turn is like God, i.e., sharing any of His characteristics, is in agreement along the line of those shared characteristics. Where their characteristics disagree, they are out of line--- tilted, if you will.
Now, if we wish to describe convergence/agreement with the term 'good,' then so be it. Such a description seems to fit nearly everything else we use the label for, as does the opposite term, 'bad' seem to fit both a disconnect from our power/love source as well as what we have traditionally held to be abhorrent in life.
It would not matter if the atheist simply says that flourishing is good because that is just the way it is; or that it is simply a brute moral fact. He is still no worse off or better off than yourself.
Except you haven't offered a compelling reason why flourishing is better, good or what-have-you... in any way, preferred. The atheist is left with simple survival and no reason for it, nothing which could possibly offer a purpose in doing so. Living is no more significant than dying. Ironically, for the theist, living is equated with dying, but they both have purposes.
The atheist has none.
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17 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHFreaky: ...you haven't offered a compelling reason why flourishing is better, good or what-have-you... in any way, preferred."
[b]But now you're telling me that the theist's recourse is to the idea that God simply makes stuff good through some sort of mysterious divine fiat.
I don't know that it's all that mysterious, really. The Bible says He spoke it into existence, which seems nearly too simple to most thinking. However, when one considers that man follows a similar path ...[text shortened]... s equated with dying, but they both have purposes.
The atheist has none.[/b]
Freaky, you could advance the discussion by presenting a compelling reason to "describe convergence/agreement [with _________ ] with the term 'good.'"
You could provide a model for such reasoning.
(I insert "with _________" because I don't want to put words in your mouth like "with God's character."😉
17 Aug 11
Originally posted by JS357I thought that I'd already done so. The agreement/convergence is analogous to those points wherein our intentional actions are in accord with God's. Simplified, one could use a light switch as an example. On is good, off is bad.
Freaky: ...you haven't offered a compelling reason why flourishing is better, good or what-have-you... in any way, preferred."
Freaky, you could advance the discussion by presenting a compelling reason to "describe convergence/agreement [with _________ ] with the term 'good.'"
You could provide a model for such reasoning.
(I insert "with _________" because I don't want to put words in your mouth like "with God's character."😉
17 Aug 11
Originally posted by bbarrWell, if the theist isn't really concerned with morality, then I'm not sure why we're having this conversation.
Well, if the theist isn't really concerned with morality, then I'm not sure why we're having this conversation. I was under the impression that theists who advocate things like Divine Command Theory, Natural Law Theory, Virtue Ethics, etc., were explicitly concerned with morality, since they are taking the time to articulate theories of morality. If morality ...[text shortened]... erhaps lament that they were poorly raised, or psychologically damaged.
I said "overly concerned," because the theist is far more concerned (ok, should be far more concerned) with his spiritual growth and life than he is with attempts to prove why he is thusly engaged. The theist uses morality as a touchstone of understood concepts in order to make his case for God, but realizes the limitations morality represents in living the Christian life. Just as true professionals make every effort to remain intellectually honest as opposed to being merely sincere, the Christian has a code of conduct much higher than mere morality. Because it represents a well-known, innate and basic social contract, theists use morality to draw certain points.
First, it doesn't correctly apply to those who have idiosyncratic desires regarding their own treatment. If the misanthropic hermit desires no help from others, the Golden Rule seems to give him license to ignore others in distress. But that's just callousness, and callousness is typically wrong.
I don't know that the integrity of the group necessarily diminishes or increases the legitimacy of the contract. If a group of hermits inhabited various isolated parts of a wilderness region and had an unwritten rule "do not resuscitate," or some such, I believe their restraint in doing so for one another is just as noble as any other form of self-sacrifice, as their inaction is out of respect for the other's sovereignty--- not cowardice or hatred.
"Why is flourishing good?", or "Why is virtue good?", my response is that these are intrinsically good; that our concept 'Good', when unpacked, and our usage of it examined, is best explained by positing that human flourishing and virtuous character are bedrock, and function as moral foundations.
And here lies at least one of the cruxes. In light of the idea that tomorrow's death renders today's actions of life insignificant, how is my abstinence in taking something desirable from another human being better than their decision to keep it for themselves, knowing I want it?
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17 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHRemembering that you said to bbarr: "you haven't offered a compelling reason why flourishing is better, good or what-have-you... in any way, preferred."
I thought that I'd already done so. The agreement/convergence is analogous to those points wherein our intentional actions are in accord with God's. Simplified, one could use a light switch as an example. On is good, off is bad.
Now as an example of a compelling reason to accept your view, you offer "The agreement/convergence is analogous to those points wherein our intentional actions are in accord with God's. Simplified, one could use a light switch as an example. On is good, off is bad."
Thanks for the example. Then should I take it you would accept something like the following?
Our intentional actions are in accord with human flourishing, or are not in accord with it. It is like, for example, a light switch -- on is good, off is bad.
17 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHI don't know that it's all that mysterious, really. The Bible says He spoke it into existence, which seems nearly too simple to most thinking. However, when one considers that man follows a similar path, i.e., making plans, visualizing the results and etc., speaking things into existence ceases to be that much of a stretch.
[b]But now you're telling me that the theist's recourse is to the idea that God simply makes stuff good through some sort of mysterious divine fiat.
I don't know that it's all that mysterious, really. The Bible says He spoke it into existence, which seems nearly too simple to most thinking. However, when one considers that man follows a similar path ...[text shortened]... s equated with dying, but they both have purposes.
The atheist has none.[/b]
Making plans and visualizing results is hardly speaking things into existence. If you want to bring about a cold beer, can you just speak it into existence? If the beer you have in your hand is warm and you would rather it be icy cold, can you just speak its being icy cold into existence? Of course man can plan and visualize and execute on, say, brewing and bottling a beer into existence or, say, sticking a beer on ice. But then we are talking about something different. Saying that there is some agent who speaks things and their goodness into existence sounds like pure fantasy, no less than if I were to claim that I speak beers and their icy coldness into existence. The subject here was about ultimate explication for things and goodness. I think you are fooling yourself if you think you have succeeded to some greater degree here than the atheist. The point is that both of you have some normative bedrock, which has nothing underlying it; and both of you will likely end up stuck with some brute facts in my estimation. If you ask some atheist, for example, what makes flourishing good and he responds that it is simply good in and of itself or that it is simply a brute fact that it is good, then that may sound unsatisfactory to you and may leave the question of how some positive fact can simply have no explanation. But your response that God speaks stuff into existence seems worse and even more explanatorily unsatisfactory, since it leaves many further questions for which you have no good response, such as how is it even possible for such things to be spoken into existence; what explains God's supposed ability to speak such things into existence; what explains God's supposed existence in the first place; why are we taking on this baggage of a supernatural category; etc?
And, I will contend that I didn't say God makes good stuff. I don't know that we got to that point, really. Let's just say that God makes all stuff, that without God no stuff exists (for the theist's argument) and leave valuation for later.
Okay, but I guess I would remind you that you were the one who said that the "root" of the thought experiment lies in the question of "what makes something good?" And you implied that the theist has a better or more comprehensive explanatory platform here than the atheist. Now you are saying that you just want to contend that God speaks stuff into existence…but let us leave the valuation for later. Which is it: do theists have a more comprehensive explanatory program here than atheists, or not? As I have already stated, I think you are on no better footing than the moral atheist on this matter. Both of you have some normative bedrock where you take up normative premise(s) based on nothing; they are basic in themselves. And I think both of you will be committed in the end to some brute facts; thus, so much for explaining everything.
If we view god-like behavior as the standard, and un-god-like behavior as the failure, perhaps the dilemma is solved.
How does this solve the dilemma? The dilemma: is god-like behavior good because god's behavior always aligns with an independent standard of goodness, or is god-like behavior good because god's behavior simply is the standard of goodness? Here, you have just chosen the latter horn of the dilemma, but I do not think you have addressed the problems that go along with that choice.
Further, it seems you find it explanatorily satisfactory that you would answer the question "What makes god-like behavior good?" with "Oh, it is simply definitive of goodness." Since you have told me that your views are not intellectually hypocritical, I assume therefore that you would find it explanatorily satisfactory if the example atheist answers the question "What makes flourishing good?" with "Oh, it is simply definitive of goodness."
Except you haven't offered a compelling reason why flourishing is better, good or what-have-you... in any way, preferred.
Well, you just tried to tell me that you think god-like behavior is good simply because you stipulate it as the standard of goodness. This is another case of pot/kettle, I think.
17 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHFreaky, thank you. But Bennett is the professional philosopher. I am what you call a hack.
Let me take a break right here and say something probably uncharacteristic of me otherwise. I fully understand the wide gap between LJ, bbarr (and others herein who have offered their slants on the opposing side) and me, the ill-equipped theist. But I have to tell you, despite our contentions otherwise, I find myself exceedingly grateful for a chance to ...[text shortened]... reciated. Hope that didn't sound too over the top. Now let's get back to the fisticuffs.