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18 Aug 11
Originally posted by FreakyKBHI guess the rub would be the insertion of a new concept. With the theist, the thought/behavior/action which is in accord with God is called good. Not sure how to express that as an actual formula, but something along the lines of:
I guess the rub would be the insertion of a new concept. With the theist, the thought/behavior/action which is in accord with God is called good. Not sure how to express that as an actual formula, but something along the lines of:
"Truth = good and if t = Truth, then t = good"
For the atheist, the thought/behavior/action which is in accord with flou ...[text shortened]... urements, standard of the term good--- not matter how it is constituted in his own mind.
"Truth = good and if t = Truth, then t = good"
.....I would have thought you'd say "In accord with God = good and it t = in accord with God then t = good."
For the atheist, the thought/behavior/action which is in accord with flourishing is called good, or:
"Flourishing = good and if t = Flourishing, then t = good"
So the formulas appear the same, but the distinction comes with the designation of the term 'good.' We think of God as good because a person (Him) said so. He had to call Himself something, so let's not quibble about the value just yet.
...... then nor shall we accept it just yet.
But we the good that we attribute to flourishing is attributed by us--- we give it that value. That might not be a problem, but we'll see. Upon what is our valuation of good based? Given that life is accidental, has no purpose, cannot be prolonged for any significant amount of time, is headed toward certain destruction and will leave no source of help or history, what makes flourishing good? Is there any good at all, really?
.... I'd say the good we attribute to being in accord with God is attributed by us. there being no evidence other than the writings of man, that it is so.
.... if the good of flourishing is negated only by those things, this in fact only reinforces the good of flourishing. You can say what is the good of flourishing if we net out at zero, but we can reply, let's flourish while we can, anyway, and leave behind a flourishing society, if we can. Flourishing is good, even if it's not forever.
Back to the theist, who at least appears to have somewhat of an objective, i.e., outside of his own measurements, standard of the term good--- not matter how it is constituted in his own mind.
....I don't this it has that appearance in the least. It's projection.
19 Aug 11
Originally posted by JS357You already cited where exactly Aquinas is based, JS357
I hope you will state what specific positions of Aquinas (in your view) BB failed to refute, and that one of you will cite the writings of Aquinas that are involved.
The following cites some possible source materials:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6404/is_n3_v56/ai_n28661924/
It says:
"The doctrine of God's infinite incomprehensibility re ...[text shortened]... sks, "How are we to understand what the evangelist says: 'No one has ever seen God'?""
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19 Aug 11
Originally posted by pyxelatedIf one's premises is bonkers, one's argument based on these premises is bonkers😵
Ookay... don't have time for a comprehensive reply right now, but "he just accepts blindly his unjustified religious dogma" counts as a refutation? You state his argument and then just assert that his premises are bad. I don't think you've refuted him. 🙂 But more later.
19 Aug 11
Originally posted by Bosse de NageTurtles all the way down, yes.
He begs the question. Turtles all the way down. The unmoved mover? Colour me unmoved.
Since no substantial distinction between the properties "mover" and "move" is existent and the conceptualization of a mover and a move in these terms is just a result of cognitive convenience, I do colour you unmoved😵
19 Aug 11
Originally posted by pyxelatedHis premises are bonkers, because:
True. But the mere assertion "his premises are bonkers" doesn't make his premises bonkers. 🙂
The problem as regards Aquinas’ theology is rooted on his basic ignorance, which he tries to have it overridden: instead of admitting simply that he doesn’t know on his own and that he just accepts blindly his dogma (thus somebody else’s ideas), he pretends that he knows (because he read it in his “Holy Book&rdquo😉, and then he goes on pontificating wildly apologetic. If his basic premise could only be evaluated as factual, then we could debate about his logic per se. However, for one, Aquinas does not (because in fact he cannot) explain neither why he accepts “John” and in general his religious dogma, nor how did he came on his own to evaluate “John” as tenable. He just believes blindly something, just as a kiddo believes that Santa is existent.
For two, I measure the validity of his theology by its efficacy alone (thus I examine at first his basic premise, the cornerstone of his exegesis), and not by the conformity of his prepositions to the principles of formal logic, of a specific religion, of a philosophical or a metaphysical doctrine, or of epistemology.
The above reasons force me to conclude that efficacy is non-existent in Summa, because Aquinas’ whole construction is based on a blind, unjustified belief accepted solely by specific believers of specific denominations of the Christian religion. As our Palynka said, Aquinas should first have had a detailed exegesis offered about the agent that forced him to analyze, evaluate and at last accept John’s beliefs as tenable; only then he could proceed.
I don’t accept authoritative views blindly, I accept views solely after analysis and evaluation. Why should I accept Aquinas’ theology as tenable since his argument is locked on unjustified premises?
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19 Aug 11
Originally posted by PalynkaI have to shot you my Pal some good ouzo and meze when you 'll visit again Greece (Apallarina is unique and quite mellow, perfect for conversation and good time with friends; we keep it in the fridge till its colour turns milky, enjoy it for auld lang syne with ice made of good water)
You're trying too hard. What bb is saying is that his premises should be more adequately justified.
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19 Aug 11
Originally posted by black beetleMy daily rumination:
Sure thing;
Aquinas suggests that G-d is an existent observer, and he tries to overcome his inability to simply state "well, this is the epistemic object in question, you have it in front of you and it is as real as any other existent observer that you are noticing everyday" by using the trick of the so called "incomprehensibility of G-d". This way, ...[text shortened]... no stress, this is theology afterall: bad philosophy, theoplacia, supreme mambo-jumbo
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OK so I have correctly identified the most relevant source materials from Aquinas, generally speaking the Summa and also, specifically, certain sections of the Commentary on John. Now I wonder if this additional work will help pyx further. I do have one comment for you at the end.
Your statement, "This way, he hopes to establish as factual the hypothesis that G-d cannot be directly observed although it is an existent entity" seems to be the Thomist position you critique. In this, the word "observed" means not just physical visibility, but "observed" by the intellect.
Your statement, "Aquinas speaks of the incomprehensible G-d as the infinitely understandable God; and he feels quite comfortable, probably because he thinks he is not obliged to explain how exactly and by what means “the part of G-d that remains eternally denied to the finite intellect in its quest of understanding” became an epistemic object" seems to be the central point of your critique. That is, Aquinas has failed to support a central but unspoken premise of his argument: an object having a part that is inaccessible to a finite intellect, can nonetheless be known by that finite intellect to exist, and can be known to have that part, and, moreover, that object (God) IS known by that finite intellect, to exist.
Comment: It seems to me that Aquinas specifies that some objects of knowledge come to be known by means other than reason, that means being faith, which is revealed to the intellect by God's grace. Here are some quotes from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faith_and_rationality
Quoting Aquinas:
We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions. Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light.[4]
[Faith is] a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object.[5]
Faith does not involve a search by natural reason to prove what is believed. But it does involve a form of inquiry unto things by which a person is led to belief, e.g. whether they are spoken by God and confirmed by miracles.[6]
[T]he object of faith is that which is absent from our understanding. As Augustine said, “we believe that which is absent, but we see that which is present.”[7]
[O]pinion includes a fear that the other part [of the contradiction] is true, and scientific knowledge excludes such fear. Similarly, it is impossible to have faith and scientific knowledge about the same thing.[8]
unquote
So it seems to me that Aquinas and those who follow his lead would see no problem with your objection, since any supposed knowledge not arrived at by reason is arrived at by, or as, faith.
19 Aug 11
Originally posted by JS357Hey, here's an idea for you three. Why not take the ideas you're ruminating on and start a new thread under the name of, say, Aquinas, or some such?
My daily rumination:
OK so I have correctly identified the most relevant source materials from Aquinas, generally speaking the Summa and also, specifically, certain sections of the Commentary on John. Now I wonder if this additional work will help pyx further. I do have one comment for you at the end.
Your statement, "This way, he hopes to establish as f ...[text shortened]... since any supposed knowledge not arrived at by reason is arrived at by, or as, faith.
19 Aug 11
Originally posted by JS357Your response is borderline gibberish, for lack of keyboard discipline. Try again, if you can.
[b]I guess the rub would be the insertion of a new concept. With the theist, the thought/behavior/action which is in accord with God is called good. Not sure how to express that as an actual formula, but something along the lines of:
"Truth = good and if t = Truth, then t = good"
.....I would have thought you'd say "In accord with God = good and it t = ...[text shortened]... d.
....I don't this it has that appearance in the least. It's projection.[/b]
19 Aug 11
Originally posted by LemonJelloIf you want to bring about a cold beer, can you just speak it into existence?
I don't know that it's all that mysterious, really. The Bible says He spoke it into existence, which seems nearly too simple to most thinking. However, when one considers that man follows a similar path, i.e., making plans, visualizing the results and etc., speaking things into existence ceases to be that much of a stretch.
Making plans and visuali ...[text shortened]... s the standard of goodness. This is another case of pot/kettle, I think.[/b]
Depends. Is my wife in the kitchen, where she should be?
Saying that there is some agent who speaks things and their goodness into existence sounds like pure fantasy, no less than if I were to claim that I speak beers and their icy coldness into existence.
I liken it to our ability to use language in a meaningful way. Language is a representation of relate-able thought; without using the same words, we are able to convey thoughts to other conscious human beings. This speaks to a language beyond our decimated utterances, which, crude as our efforts might be, affords us the opportunity to swim in the same stream as thought itself travels. No, we cannot speak a beer into existence, but we have numerous examples of folks who spoke their futures into existence.
One example that comes to mind is the actor Jim Carrey, who, years before he made it big, had written a check made out to himself, with the dollar figure of $20M on its face. This was the figure he told himself he would be paid for services rendered in making a feature film. Perhaps a touch cute, but it serves as just one proof.
If you ask some atheist, for example, what makes flourishing good and he responds that it is simply good in and of itself or that it is simply a brute fact that it is good, then that may sound unsatisfactory to you and may leave the question of how some positive fact can simply have no explanation.
Right. A valuation he gives it himself, without reference to anything other than himself. I guess, because he likes it, that makes it good.
I'll think more on the dilemma and see if I haven't already answered it--- and just failed to accurately articulate it--- or if I am overlooking some aspect thereof.
19 Aug 11
1 edit
Originally posted by JS357It seems to me that Aquinas specifies that some objects of knowledge come to be known by means other than reason, that means being faith, which is revealed to the intellect by God's grace.
My daily rumination:
OK so I have correctly identified the most relevant source materials from Aquinas, generally speaking the Summa and also, specifically, certain sections of the Commentary on John. Now I wonder if this additional work will help pyx further. I do have one comment for you at the end.
Your statement, "This way, he hopes to establish as f since any supposed knowledge not arrived at by reason is arrived at by, or as, faith.
There have been claims on here before (not saying that you are making the claim) that faith and revelation are somehow valid epistemic—or at least cognitive—categories. But it seems, in fact, that they are used to claim that one can “know” something without any way to even question the justificatory base for that “knowledge”, or its facticity. Nice work, if you can get it.
“It has been revealed that _________________.”
“How do you know that revelation is true?”
“By faith….”
In other words, I don’t see any reason to accept claims that are in principle indefeasible by reason or empirical experience—and that cannot, according to the claimants, be properly questioned by reason or experience. (In the back of my mind here is a kind of “mirage effect”, where experience may be claimed, but testing is disallowed.)
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EDIT: Freaky's right; this is a bit of a hijacking of his thread (Freaky being rather insistent generally that Christianity not only can stand in the light of reason, but is inherently rational--and so needs no mysterious other cognitive category).