Questions for the moral atheist

Originally posted by epiphinehas
I was ruminating on our discussion while at work today and I think (think) I had a breakthrough of sorts. It occurs to me that as a Christian there really isn't any good reason to hold to the DCT. The better I understand virtue ethics, the more virtue ethics seems consistent with Christian theology. In fact, it seems to me that Christian theolo his points to what I gather to be the main gist of virtue ethics. What say you, Bennett?

I think DCT is probably the worst theistic moral theory. It's an incredibly childish account of the foundation of morality and of moral motivation. Here's an analogy I have used in introductory ethics classes:

When I was very young, I was kicked out of a series of preschools for biting other children (embarrassingly, this is true). It was my preferred form of conflict resolution. My mother told me not to bite other children, and threatened to swat me if it continued. Consider, then, MCT (Mother Command Theory). On this view, it is the fact that my mother forbade biting that made biting wrong, and if respect for her commands was insufficient to motivate me, then the threat of punishment would hopefully suffice.

But doesn't it seem really odd that, if MCT is right, the ultimate explanation of the wrongness of biting has nothing at all to do with the fact that biting causes pain, shows a lack of respect, violates autonomy, indicates callous selfishness, etc.? And even if the actual command is more general, like 'Don't cause pain', or 'Don't be disrespectful' or whatever, isn't it similarly odd that it is the fiat, will or command that ultimately explains the wrongness of violating these commands? If you asked a child why it's wrong to bite other children, and he responds "because my mother told me not to", you'd think the response was appropriate for a child. If an adult gave the same reason, you'd think it showed a profound poverty of moral development. You'd wonder about the emotional and intellectual maturity of that adult. We expect mature adults to be morally motivated by different reasons. If an adult said "it's wrong to bit others because they may bite you back", you'd think he was self-absorbed, callous, or mistaking prudential for moral reasons. I mean, think about the sorts of responses that would indicate to you actual moral development. You would expect, at least, an expression of direct concern for others, for their welfare, or respect for their autonomy, or their pursuit of their own ends.

And here's the rub: Nothing about this line of critique changes when talking about your God instead of about your mother. DCT still gives the wrong sort of answer to questions about the foundations of goodness and rightness, or about the most basic values. DCT still urges on theists essentially childish forms of moral deliberation and moral motivation.

So, I think you're right to reject DCT wholesale. Natural law theory is better. Virtue ethics is much better. It's an old point of Wittgenstein's that rules don't apply themselves (or, actually, this is something Kripke excavated from Wittgenstein). Similarly with moral rules and principles. Folks need their attention reliably oriented to facts in the world that call for the application of a rule. They need to know what the application of a rule requires. They need to know how to balance rules that pull in different directions. They need to be able to recognize situations that require the refinement of rules, or that constitute counterexamples to rules. All this requires mature moral judgment, or wisdom, or (again, Aristotle's term) phronesis. But, if all this is right, then it's silly to talk about rules as anything other than generally reliable empirical generalizations about typical situations. These are fine, as abstractions that can scaffold moral education, guide moral deliberation on the fly, remind us of what's good and right when we're weak, etc. But they don't do the work that many, many philosophers have thought they could. They only work when conjoined with a pretty sophisticated account of character, conceived as a constellation of dispositions with attentive, conative, cognitive, and motivational components. The good traits are the virtues, and real wisdom requires them all. When virtue ethics point to exemplars, they are not typically basing their accounts on those exemplars. Clearly, an account of virtue is conceptually and epistemologically prior to an account of what constitutes the virtuous agent or exemplar. To phrase the point in typically Greek fashion, we can't identify the heroes without an account of the good, noble, fine and excellent. Virtue ethics makes use of exemplars as behavioral models. If a virtuous agent would A in some situation, then it is probably OK for you to A as well (though there are counterexamples here; a virtuous agent would shake the hand of the guy who beat him at tennis. I shouldn't shake hands, since I'm so angry that I'll hit the guy if he gets too close). It is not that a virtuous agent would A in some situation that makes it the case that A is right. That's just the sort of voluntarism that raises problems for DCT, and leads directly to a modified form of the Euthyphro dilemma.

But, of course, the obvious question is what makes some trait a good one and, hence, a virtue. There are many, many accounts of this. But, if you're interested in pursuing this further, check out Robert Merrihew Adams; a fantastic philosopher working in ethics and religion, who has published wonderful articles on DCT, and who has recently presented a theistic virtue ethics in "A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good".

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]Your own view does not rest on descriptive claims about God. Your view rests upon a normative claim about God; namely that his character is good by definition, or the standard of goodness, or whatever. You take, in effect, one free normative premise.
I confess not to follow, as my theology is based upon both descriptive and normative claims about g with God is good; anything capable of being filled which is deficient of Him is evil.[/b]

Of course your theology and, by extension, your moral theory are based on both descriptive and normative claims about God. My point above is that there is no argument that begins solely from premises that are purely descriptive claims about God and that yields normative claims about what's right and wrong. To get those conclusions, you need to supplement your premise set with some normative claims. These claims you'll just have to assume. They will be your free normative premises. That God is essentially good, or the standard of goodness, or that his commands yield obligations, or whatever, are some of the possible normative premises you'll have to simply take as basic in order to get any conclusions about morality from your theology.

But, the thing is, if you are comfortable assuming some normative premises that constitute ultimate explanations for moral norms, rightness and wrongness, obligations, etc., then it is simply perverse to claim that the secular ethicist is in some dialectically impoverished position when he does the same thing. If I present some version of virtue ethics (i.e., an ethic that seeks to explain goodness and rightness on the basis of some more fundamental notion of character excellence or, perhaps, human flourishing) that takes as a basic normative premise that compassion, respect and courage, for instance, are virtues; that they are character excellences, and that we have reason to cultivate them, then you can't simply argue that my view fails some test for objectivity because I haven't derived this claim from premises about particle physics. You don't derive your normative claims about God and his relationship to morality from purely descriptive premises about God. So I shouldn't have to derive my normative claims about virtue from purely descriptive claims about matter. In this regard, our views are dialectically symmetrical. Of course, this is not to say that I think our views are equally plausible or intuitive. I think ethical inquiry that starts with a robust conception of human flourishing and excellence in character will end up tracking our best-considered judgments about morality better, and provide better guidance, than any version of theistic ethics.

At the end of the day, the relevant question is not about materialism, nor objectivity, but about whether we can flesh out a framework for thinking about ethics that tracks our intuitions, allows us to deliberate effectively, gives us a good shot at leading a healthy and happy life. Such a framework may require us to take a whole bunch of stuff of normatively basic. We may be led to the conclusion that it is something like a brute normative fact that unnecessary suffering is an intrinsic bad (and by that I just mean that everyone has a reason to avoid it, attempt to alleviate it, and so on, even though that reason may be outweighed by others in some situations). This strikes me as much more plausible than an account that divorces the badness of suffering from its effect on the sufferer; that ignores the 'ouchiness' of suffering, and then attempts to explain the normative status of suffering on the basis of the commands, will or character of some other agent. Setting a puppy on fire is bad because of what it does to the puppy, not because God is offended by the action, loves puppies, or whatever.

Originally posted by bbarr
Of course your theology and, by extension, your moral theory are based on both descriptive and normative claims about God. My point above is that there is no argument that begins solely from premises that are purely descriptive claims about God and that yields normative claims about what's right and wrong. To get those conclusions, you need to supple ...[text shortened]... es to the puppy, not because God is offended by the action, loves puppies, or whatever.

Allow me to digest this and get back tomorrow, if time permits.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Allow me to digest this and get back tomorrow, if time permits.

Time will definitely let you have it. All the time in the world.

Originally posted by sonhouse
Time will definitely let you have it. All the time in the world.

Thanks, bro.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Allow me to digest this and get back tomorrow, if time permits.

Take your time, Brother. It's a good discussion.

Originally posted by bbarr
Of course your theology and, by extension, your moral theory are based on both descriptive and normative claims about God. My point above is that there is no argument that begins solely from premises that are purely descriptive claims about God and that yields normative claims about what's right and wrong. To get those conclusions, you need to supple ...[text shortened]... es to the puppy, not because God is offended by the action, loves puppies, or whatever.

"I think ethical inquiry that starts with a robust conception of human flourishing and excellence in character will end up tracking our best-considered judgments about morality better, and provide better guidance, than any version of theistic ethics. "

This is an interesting statement. It seems to imply that no theistic ethics can endorse starting with a robust conception of human flourishing and excellence in character.

At any rate, I am enjoying being in the mostly quiet audience.

Originally posted by Palynka
No, worries, I'm glad we're back on track.

I became a self-designed non-cognitivist after first hearing about it here and then going on to read about in in Wikipedia and, more importantly, also at plato.stanford.edu. So, as you can see, I don't have a formal understanding of the concepts and so I understand that my use of such labels may not be as crisp a e or the other, although I believe in most cases it would be the latter.

O.K., it seems like you want to analyze normative expressions like “Behavior X is good” as composed of two parts: (1) The expression of a preference that X be done, and (2) the expression of a preference that others prefer that X be done. It is not that these preferences make the claim “Behavior X is good” true, since on your view normative claims can’t be true or false. Rather, it is that by sincerely uttering “Behavior X is good” you are manifesting these twin preferences.

Suppose that you are playing chess against S, and he’s put you in a position where he could easily win by capturing your rook. You sincerely think to yourself “S should take my rook.” How would you analyze this normative claim? It can’t be that this thought expresses your preference that S take your rook, since you would prefer to win. Similarly, it can’t be an expression of your preference that S prefer to take your rook, since what you prefer is for S to prefer some other move. Perhaps the thought “S should take my rook” is elliptical for something like “If I were S, I should take my rook”. But, if you were S, although you would prefer to take the rook, you wouldn’t prefer that your opponent prefer you to take the rook. Typically, we don’t prefer that our opponents in chess endorse our beating them. It looks like you’ll have to present different analyses of claims like “S should take my rook” and “S should tell the truth”. But then I wonder what’s motivating the different analyses. The cognitivist can characterize these cases similarly, as there being sufficient reasons in both cases for S to act in such-and-such a manner. But the non-cognitivist doesn’t get to use reason-talk like that; you’ve only recourse to talk of preferences, desires, and other conative states.

Further, there are clear cases where you wouldn’t want to take the conjunction of (1) and (2) as properly expressible as claims about the good. Suppos I am suspected of a crime I’ve committed, but I prefer that Smith be charged. Suppose I also prefer that others prefer that Smith be charged. On your view (if I’ve gotten it right), these twin preferences would suffice to make it appropriate for me to say “It is good (morally right??) to charge Smith”. But that seems to get things wrong. I could have these twin preferences, and they could be really, really strong, and yet I could also believe (guiltily, ashamedly) that it would be morally wrong to charge Smith. But even if I’m not conflicted, the analysis here seems off. I could say “It is good for me that Smith be charged”, but not “It is good that Smith be charged”, and certainly not “It is morally right that Smith be charged”. So, I wonder whether cases like this point out the difficulty of providing perspicuous non-cognitive analyses of moral claims. And, of course, objections to non-cognitivism regarding its ability to deal with cases of moral inference, or the apparent validity of some forms of moral argument, are directly related to these worries.

In any case, I wonder whether non-cognitivism doesn’t just amount to normative skepticism; a form of nihilism. Do you think that any preferences are better than others, or that some preferences are inappropriate, or that people ought to have some preferences rather than others? If you are a thoroughgoing non-cognitivist, then you’ll read that question as simply asking whether you have some preferences that are stronger than others, or some preferences regarding the preferences of other persons. But if that is your analysis of the question, then it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that your position doesn’t amount to an ethical view at all. It is more a species of psychology. You are not engaging in moral philosophy, which is a normative enterprise. Rather, you are attempting to reduce or translate normative claims to descriptions of psychological states. If so, then I wonder why we’re having this discussion at all. The original post concerned the moral atheist; or (I take it) the atheist that takes moral claims seriously. But if I’ve accurately characterized your position, then you don’t take moral claims seriously, except inasmuch as they express strong preferences.

Originally posted by bbarr
Of course your theology and, by extension, your moral theory are based on both descriptive and normative claims about God. My point above is that there is no argument that begins solely from premises that are purely descriptive claims about God and that yields normative claims about what's right and wrong. To get those conclusions, you need to supple ...[text shortened]... es to the puppy, not because God is offended by the action, loves puppies, or whatever.

I'm getting your point about the distinctions between normative and descriptive claims and I see how there at least appears to be a symmetry between the jumps made by theists and the non-affiliated. Not to quibble too small a point, I think it is worthy noting, however, that theism isn't overly concerned with morals, per se, because he views morals as oughts among men, not necessarily toward God. Therefore, morality doesn't really require God when considering it as an isolated aspect of human existence, since man ought to treat man as he desires others to treat him... regardless of any other consideration. That social contract does not superficially require the invocation of God.

I see the problem beginning for the atheist when the question is posed,"Why ought?" Yes, the discussion will likely involve flourishing and whatnot, but the atheist cannot answer the most basic of questions, the root of the thought experiment: what makes something good? Why/how is flourishing any better than not flourishing? What is better, really, as any type of description? At the end of his shuffle, the atheist is left with 'because he likes it,' and little else. I guess it comes down to the atheist never really able to make normative claims, but rather, he is stuck with a bunch of equally-weighted descriptive claims. Nothing pierces the ceiling into transcendence from what I can see.

And what would it take to be able to accurately describe God's pronouncements or commands as normative? In the Garden, when He walked and talked with the man and the woman in the cool of the evening, could His conversations with them be categorized as normative claims, i.e., is the authority only good for first person accounts, or can revelation be passed on?

When the theist says,"Life sucks," in reference to the fallen nature of man, can not the atheist agree with the sentiment even if he rejects the cause and cannot that overlap of convergence be considered a normative claim derived from descriptive claims?

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
I'm getting your point about the distinctions between normative and descriptive claims and I see how there at least appears to be a symmetry between the jumps made by theists and the non-affiliated. Not to quibble too small a point, I think it is worthy noting, however, that theism isn't overly concerned with morals, per se, because he views morals as oug ...[text shortened]... verlap of convergence be considered a normative claim derived from descriptive claims?

"...the atheist cannot answer the most basic of questions, the root of the thought experiment: what makes something good?"

I hope you will explain why the atheist can't, and so presumably, the theist can, answer this question. Not just respond to it, but answer it.

Originally posted by JS357
"I think ethical inquiry that starts with a robust conception of human flourishing and excellence in character will end up tracking our best-considered judgments about morality better, and provide better guidance, than any version of theistic ethics. "

This is an interesting statement. It seems to imply that no theistic ethics can endorse starting with a ro ...[text shortened]... and excellence in character.

At any rate, I am enjoying being in the mostly quiet audience.

Sorry for the delay. I'll respond to this tomorrow. And please, don't stay "mostly quiet". I enjoy your contributions to the discussion.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
I'm getting your point about the distinctions between normative and descriptive claims and I see how there at least appears to be a symmetry between the jumps made by theists and the non-affiliated. Not to quibble too small a point, I think it is worthy noting, however, that theism isn't overly concerned with morals, per se, because he views morals as oug verlap of convergence be considered a normative claim derived from descriptive claims?

I see the problem beginning for the atheist when the question is posed,"Why ought?" Yes, the discussion will likely involve flourishing and whatnot, but the atheist cannot answer the most basic of questions, the root of the thought experiment: what makes something good? Why/how is flourishing any better than not flourishing? What is better, really, as any type of description? At the end of his shuffle, the atheist is left with 'because he likes it,' and little else. I guess it comes down to the atheist never really able to make normative claims, but rather, he is stuck with a bunch of equally-weighted descriptive claims. Nothing pierces the ceiling into transcendence from what I can see.

I see the problem beginning for the theist when the question is posed,"Why ought?" Yes, the discussion will likely involve communing with God and whatnot, but the theist cannot answer the most basic of questions, the root of the thought experiment: what makes something good? Why/how is following God's commands or aligning with God's will any better than not doing such things? What is better, really, as any type of description? At the end of his shuffle, the theist is left with 'because God likes it,' and little else. I guess it comes down to the theist never really able to make normative claims, but rather, he is stuck with a bunch of equally-weighted descriptive claims. Nothing pierces the ceiling into transcendence from what I can see.

I could take every single one of your arguments in this thread, intended against atheists, and aim it toward your own noetic structure with equal effect. The good news for both sides is that none of your arguments carry much force. I'm sure you'll agree that this argument of yours does not raise too much concern against your own stance. The truth is that you are not forced to start solely with descriptive premises, such as "God likes X". You have some normative bedrock, where you take up your "free" normative premises. The moral atheist will do the same. Not sure why this is soooooo hard to understand.

If it really is such a difficult problem to ultimately explain "what makes something good", this will still present no more problem to the atheist than it does to you yourself. None of your arguments have shown that you are in any better explanatory position in this respect than the atheist.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
I see the problem beginning for the atheist when the question is posed,"Why ought?" Yes, the discussion will likely involve flourishing and whatnot, but the atheist cannot answer the most basic of questions, the root of the thought experiment: what makes something good? Why/how is flourishing any better than not flourishing? What is better, really, as a ...[text shortened]... t overlap of convergence be considered a normative claim derived from descriptive claims?

"I see the problem beginning for the atheist when the question is posed,"Why ought?" Yes, the discussion will likely involve flourishing and whatnot, but the atheist cannot answer the most basic of questions, the root of the thought experiment: what makes something good?"

because such a question has no absolute answer. what makes something good or evil is entirely subjective and influenced by the situation. it is further differentiated by motive and result: an ambiguously good motive can have an ambiguously evil result while an ambiguously evil motive can have an ambiguously good result.


" Why/how is flourishing any better than not flourishing?"

flourishing improves the quality of life and increases the chances of survival and passing on heredity, it makes the subject more successful in life or in the pursuit of interest, hence it is good for the subject to flourish while the opposite decreases chances and is detrimental to the health and life of the subject. this is the response you were expecting obviously. that however, does not make it any less true.


"Nothing pierces the ceiling into transcendence from what I can see."

i haven't noticed any piercing of the transcendence from any religious adherent. i've noticed many of them make absurd claims of having done so, however. are you one of them?


"In the Garden, when He [Biblegod] walked and talked with the man and the woman in the cool of the evening, could His conversations with them be categorized as normative claims, i.e., is the authority only good for first person accounts, or can revelation be passed on?"

seriously, you're asking for an analysis of a fictional story?

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
I'm getting your point about the distinctions between normative and descriptive claims and I see how there at least appears to be a symmetry between the jumps made by theists and the non-affiliated. Not to quibble too small a point, I think it is worthy noting, however, that theism isn't overly concerned with morals, per se, because he views morals as oug ...[text shortened]... verlap of convergence be considered a normative claim derived from descriptive claims?

Edit: "Why ought?"

Methinks the sole thing that "makes something good/ bad" is the evaluation of the mind.
Instead of favoring theoretical reflection over praxis and devoting your mind to solving metaphysical problems with the assumption that the atheist need these problems to be solved in order to live a meaningful/ moral life, you could simply try to analyze what exactly morality is. Speculating on soteriological problems is dismissed, because morality does not require the theoretical speculation you imply. Morality is nothing but the product of the critical, self-reflective evaluation of the mind as regards a specific behavior that relates to the society solely in the context of avoiding specific praxes (whenever these praxes are harmful to the society in whole or in part or to its members) and in the context of promoting a behavior that benefits the society and its members. In my opinion, this is not at all "little else". Also, I am not concerned to find something that "pierces the ceiling into transcendence". If you think there is indeed something more worth of further evaluation in the realm of the epistemic objects, bring it up, inform us as regards the way you received the required pieces of information about it, and we will evaluate it. However your tendency to conceptualize the so called “transcendence” is futile, and not only because each attempt of the theist to “analyze” “G-d” cancels on the spot the “transcendence” of this fictional entity (fictional, because it is not an element of reality).

Methinks morality has neither a specific audience, nor it is not merely identical to one’s (subjective in full) evaluation of the mind. Keeping up privileging metaphysics over praxis and insisting that morality requires a “correct understanding” of certain metaphysical problems related to the doctrine of your religion, to me sounds unsound.
As usually, I ended up with my black coffee😵

Originally posted by LemonJello
I see the problem beginning for the atheist when the question is posed,"Why ought?" Yes, the discussion will likely involve flourishing and whatnot, but the atheist cannot answer the most basic of questions, the root of the thought experiment: what makes something good? Why/how is flourishing any better than not flourishing? What is better, really, t you are in any better explanatory position in this respect than the atheist.

You make it sound easier than I anticipated.

Why/how is following God's commands or aligning with God's will any better than not doing such things?
Here's what is missing in the atheist's puzzle. He is okay with man flourishing, but can't give him any compelling reason to do so... other than to say that he ought to. Presumably, he could make such statements as 'if man is to survive, he ought to do such-and-such,' but there is simply the assumption that survival is good or preferred. Certainly, we innately agree (given our sunny dispositions) that survival is better than the alternative, but even our optimism has its limitations in trying to describe why survival matters in light of a pointless existence. By pointless, I mean came from nowhere, headed nowhere--- I hope that you can live with that generality as a swap for your otherwise unnamed/unconsidered thoughts on origins.

I suppose the atheist can adopt a form of egoism himself, a selfish gene type of mentality, but he is still hard-pressed to turn that motivation into an end-of-the-day ought. If he is to appeal to the urge for life, then he is back at square one with all of his urges... and we know that some of them aren't what we would otherwise call preferable.

The theist doesn't have the same problem, because he embraces the concept of self-love. His pattern is the ultimate example of self-love, and of love itself: God. The theist understands that man is selfish and that selfishness can serve better purposes than simply following all of his urges without discrimination. He acknowledges that man's goal is joy, love and happiness and that such things are attainable and thereby give life meaning.

You have some normative bedrock, where you take up your "free" normative premises. The moral atheist will do the same. Not sure why this is soooooo hard to understand.
The bedrock for the theist is pretty straightforward: that which is good derives its value from a person who defines good. This person is the good which produces overflowing joy, whereas outside of this person's influence, there is overwhelming pain and suffering. Of course, there are some who do not call/consider a relationship with God as good, but even in doing so, they are invoking their God-like prerogatives: they are seeking their happiness, misguided as they are.

The bedrock for the atheist is not so distinct. He calls something good if it helps man flourish, and then turns around and says flourishing is good... because it helps man. Of course, this is how my challenged brain sees things. Maybe you could clear things up for me.