Theological Fatalism Revisited

Originally posted by knightmeister
The reason why the God idea does better is because it is based on an acceptance of the essence of the problem. Rather than look for further explanations which then create further problems , the God idea just simply accepts that there must be something beyond explanation or cause which is boundless both in terms of time/ causality and existence.

Again, you go with the strawman. At what point have I claimed to be looking for further explanations? It is in fact you that has been demanding them.
And as I have pointed out repeatedly, the God idea is most often used as a cover for the admission rather than an admission.

Rather than look for "closure" , the God idea accepts and embraces what reality seems to be saying to us at the ultimate end of things. What we try to do when explaining something is to draw a line under it , as if to say "Ok we have explained that , now let's move on to something else". What the God idea does is say " maybe there is no line that can be drawn and ultimately that's the reality that we must embrace. It says that there is something in existence which has no explanation in terms of something else because it just IS and always has been.
And I have no problem with any of that and in fact closely matches my own beliefs, though I don't use the word God. In fact your God idea is hardly unique so far.

The reason why this is a better solution is that an infinite regress of causes and explanations is not needed.
It does not say it is not needed, it just says it cannot be done. You are essentially pretending that you have 'solved' it when all you have really done is admitted that you cannot solve it.

One objection to your reasoning so far is that you appear to extend Goedel's incompleteness to your own version of an incoherency theorem.
Goedel does not say we cannot know about x. He says we cannot know everything about x. What we do know we do know and we can know more.
You on the other hand try to go further and question what we do know or can know.
You try to use Godels incompleteness ideas (and your similar God ideas) to claim that anything, however illogical may be possible.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Again, you go with the strawman. At what point have I claimed to be looking for further explanations? It is in fact you that has been demanding them.
And as I have pointed out repeatedly, the God idea is most often used as a cover for the admission rather than an admission.

[b]Rather than look for "closure" , the God idea accepts and embraces what rea ...[text shortened]... nd your similar God ideas) to claim that anything, however illogical may be possible.

So you agree that ultimate reality can never be "known" rationally like a solution can be known. Ultimately existence is a deep mystery , that will confound our attempts to explain it in the normal way, yes?

Originally posted by knightmeister
You say that “A has not happened for S”, but that “for God it has happened.” That makes absolutely no sense to me. --visted----


Why? For you 1939 has already happened , but for Hitler in 1938 it hasn't happened yet. For someone living in the particular dimension of time we might call 2078 , you are already dead. For you , you are alive. Who i ...[text shortened]... nts within the time dimension?

Time is relative. It's just a dimension like all the others.

KM, I want to think about this some more, but my problem at this point is this talk about “for Hitler” but not “for you” or “from God’s point of view but not yours.” The problem is that I see us as talking about perspectives here—not events.

Hitler’s activities occurred—those events happened—whether I ever know of them or not. They do not “re-happen” when I read about them in a history book.

It makes no sense to me to talk about an event, E, having happened for you but not having happened for me. E either happened or it didn’t; you may be immediately involved in E, whereas I am not (an perhaps have know knowledge of it), but that does not change whether or not E actually happened.

Now, if you look at that statement I just made, you will see that it does acknowledge the point (originally made by LJ, as well as by yourself) that knowing whether or not an event has happened has no causal effect on the actual happening. I’ll let someone more knowledgeable than I weigh in on whether or not anything happens without current observation (ala, as I understand it, the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics).

Now I’m going to go back and re-read your post to me in response to my suggestion about a move regarding God’s omniscience similar to that commonly made with regard to God’s omnipotence in the heavy-rock example. I’m not sure I gave your response full justice on the first reading, and I have not yet myself been able to formulate such a move...

Originally posted by knightmeister
So you agree that ultimate reality can never be "known" rationally like a solution can be known. Ultimately existence is a deep mystery , that will confound our attempts to explain it in the normal way, yes?

No. I currently do not think I have enough information to make that call. I do accept that it is entirely possible that we can never know everything.
As for the ultimate 'why' question, which is what I suspect you are trying to get at, I question the validity of the question more than the existence of an answer.
You say: Every answer to a why question will generate a bigger why.
I say: Every why question is only meaningful if made in terms of a bigger why. It is therefore incoherent to ask for an ultimate why.

But generally the main point we disagree on is the need to invoke God. You claim such an invocation is 'better' than any other solution. I cant see how that is. Or rather you seem to be saying:
1: There is no solution. There can be no solution.
2: God is the solution.
I think that you are simply using God to hide the no solution problem from yourself. You are clearly very uncomfortable with the no solution problem as you keep projecting your worries on to me - even when I have repeatedly denied having any such concerns.

Originally posted by vistesd
KM, I want to think about this some more, but my problem at this point is this talk about “for Hitler” but not “for you” or “from God’s point of view but not yours.” The problem is that I see us as talking about perspectives here—not events.

Hitler’s activities occurred—those events happened—whether I ever know of them or not. They ...[text shortened]... ll justice on the first reading, and I have not yet myself been able to formulate such a move...

I want to think about this some more, but my problem at this point is this talk about “for Hitler” but not “for you” or “from God’s point of view but not yours.” The problem is that I see us as talking about perspectives here—not events.

Hitler’s activities occurred—those events happened—whether I ever know of them or not. They do not “re-happen” when I read about them in a history book. ----visted------


-----RESPONSE------------

The point to grasp is that time is really a series of events one after another and no event is more special than any other. Also , time is a dimension of the universe so therefore we exist at different points of that dimension. We can measure where we are within the dimension of time.

It's patently obvious that you are not placed on the same point in the dimension of time as hitler is so therefore your perspective is BOUND to be different from his. It's like looking at a mountain from the south side of it compared to the north side. You get different views depending on where you are in 3dimensions --so why should 4d be any different.

This then leads to the point that God's perspective in time is different to ours. In one sense to him our future choices have been made in 2011 but in another real sense they haven't been made by us. They are BOTH true , our future choices are both made and not made , depending on the perspective we have on time. This sounds contradictory because we think of time as some constant thing that only exists "now" because that's how it feels for us moving through it. For Hitler in 1938 poland has not been invaded , for us it has . So who is right? We are both right!!! This is what causes the paradox because we assume time has to work in a newtonian universal way and not from a relative sense of perspective.

If a man looks at the south face of the Eiger and says " that's not such a bad climb" and another man looks at the north face and says " impossible climb!" who is right? Maybe they are both right depending on their perspective?

What this leads to is the idea that God knows what you will do tomorrow but until you get to tomorrow you can do whatever you like. He's looking at the mountain from the other side!! Tomorrow is his yesterday and both are perspectives and neither one is right or wrong because time is relative and not static.


He knows what you will do tomorrow the same as you know what Hitler will do in 1939 , but knowing what Hitler did doesn't prove that's all he ever could have done. The moment in 1939 when Hitler chooses to invade is just as valid a present moment as the one in which you are reading this post. It's only because you are looking at time from YOUR perpsective and living in this present moment that makes you feel that April 2008 is somehow more "real" time than sept 1939. In timeline terms they are both just equal and valid points on a dimension

Originally posted by knightmeister
I want to think about this some more, but my problem at this point is this talk about “for Hitler” but not “for you” or “from God’s point of view but not yours.” The problem is that I see us as talking about perspectives here—not events.

Hitler’s activities occurred—those events happened—whether I ever know of them or not. They do not “re-happen” w ...[text shortened]... 39. In timeline terms they are both just equal and valid points on a dimension

For Hitler in 1938 Poland has not been invaded , for us it has . So who is right? We are both right!!! This is what causes the paradox because we assume time has to work in a newtonian universal way and not from a relative sense of perspective.

Well, I’m not at all sure about that. Look at it this way: one the one hand you argue that God’s knowledge of what “will” happen does not causally affect what will happen;* on the other hand, you seem to be arguing that whether or not something has actually happened is dependent upon someone knowing it has happened. At least that seems to be the implication of time actually “working” according to “a relative sense of perspective.”

This is reminding of Schroedinger’s cats: neither cat is alive or dead until someone looks in the box. From the point of view of God’s eternal no-time, the cat is, was and always will be either dead or alive. If God eternally and infallibly knows that I do A, then I am, was and always will do A.

For your statement above to be correct, then there exists some world (universe) in which Hitler has actually not invaded Poland—otherwise, the phrase “for Hitler in 1938 Poland has not been invaded” has no real meaning in 2008.

______________________________________

Try this on, as my first pass at the kind of move for God’s omniscience that I suggested similar to the move on God’s omnipotence in the face of the laws of logic:

(1) God creates a universe, U, with feature T.

(2) God has not created any other U in which there is no T.**

(3) Therefore, whatever God knows about U is inescapably contextualized by T.

I think this really says no more than that, having created the universe, God cannot know the universe other than as it is and as it functions, including the dimension of time (T), however we discover that time actually “works”.

God’s perspective does not alter how the universe actually is, including how time actually is. Whatever dimensions or other features the universe has, God’s knowledge of the universe is constrained or contextualized by those features. Otherwise, God would not know the universe as it really is.

I’d go even further: once God has created the universe, God’s being has itself become contextualized by the fact of the created universe. God’s omnipotence and omniscience can no longer be thought of (even by God) except in that context. Even if God’s omnipotence now allows him to destroy the universe utterly, it does not allow him to have not created it in the first place. The very act of creating (prior to which God is not, properly, creator) commits God, and thus constrains God. This is a very powerful point long recognized in Jewish theology as well as Christian thought.

This is not dissimilar to Paul’s speaking of God’s act of kenosis, a self-emptying of pure divinity in order to become embodied (incarnate) as a human being (Philippians 2:6-7). Ekenosen, translated as “emptied”, really means to give up or lay aside what one possessed, in this case divine power. Using the image of water poured into a jar: now the water is “contextualized” by the jar, as God’s divinity became contextualized by being poured into human nature. If there is anything unique, theologically, about Christianity it is that notion of a God intentionally become constrained/contextualized by taking on human nature. But the very act of creation has a similar effect. God can no longer act as if there were no creation: God’s omnipotence and omniscience have been intentionally committed.***

______________________________________

* And I agree; my questions to LJ have to do with logical, not causal, necessity. That is, if God infallibly knows E, then E happens, and whatever agents make E happen will infallibly act to make E happen. If God infallibly knows that I reject Christ, then I infallibly reject Christ. God knows it because it infallibly happens; it does not happen (causally) because God knows it.

** This is just to set aside, at least for now, the possibility that there could be one U in which I, for example, am saved, and another in which I am not.

*** A nod to our old friend lucifershammer, who once said something about omnipotence that stimulated this line of thought, which was not original with him, as it is not with me.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]For Hitler in 1938 Poland has not been invaded , for us it has . So who is right? We are both right!!! This is what causes the paradox because we assume time has to work in a newtonian universal way and not from a relative sense of perspective.

Well, I’m not at all sure about that. Look at it this way: one the one hand you argue that God’s knowle ...[text shortened]... nce that stimulated this line of thought, which was not original with him, as it is not with me.[/b]

If God eternally and infallibly knows that I do A, then I am, was and always will do A. -----Visted---

But the thing to appreciate here is that although you do do A and will do A , A still occurs because you choose A and will choose A . The fact that you will do A does not prove that A was the only thing you could have chosen at that point in time , just as knowing Hilter chose P does not prove that P was determined.

There is an incredibly subtle mental leap we make that says "because I will do A then B was never possible" --- the point is that if you choose B , C , D.....Z etc it will make no difference to God because he will always know that one choice you make at point T2 in time WHATEVER it is.

Originally posted by knightmeister
If God eternally and infallibly knows that I do A, then I am, was and always will do A. -----Visted---

But the thing to appreciate here is that although you do do A and will do A , A still occurs because you choose A and will choose A . The fact that you will do A does not prove that A was the only thing you could have chosen at that point in time , ...[text shortened]... o God because he will always know that one choice you make at point T2 in time WHATEVER it is.

Thus we have an illusion of free will.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
Thus we have an illusion of free will.

I don't see why that follows. Free will implies that we have many potential choices but it would still in theory result in one timeline only. Determinism would also result in one timeline only. You can only live one life. God will know every choice you make /will make /have made at all points in time whether you have free will or not.

Originally posted by vistesd
Let me see if I’ve got this straight in my own head—

A. My “tautological interpretation” certainly is not the standard fatalist understanding; it certainly does not entail causal necessity. (Thanks for your explication on that). Nevertheless—

B. My understanding of your comments to tw is that a person, G, need not hold a belief “in such a way that ...[text shortened]... necessary that S will do A.

(5), (6) and (7) follow your 3”, 4”, 5”.

Comments/corrections?

Thanks for all your comments. Sorry I haven't been able to reply readily, but I would like to keep the discussion rolling.

B. My understanding of your comments to tw is that a person, G, need not hold a belief “in such a way that it could not be mistaken” in order for G to justifiably claim (fore)knowledge. (Am I correct there?)

However, if it turns out that G was mistaken, then, in fact, G did not know—by definition (at least under what I understand is the standard definition of knowing). That is, it seems that G can, prior to the unfolding of actual events, justifiably claim to know, but that this claim can prove, ex post facto, to be false.

Personally, I do agree with both of these claims: 1. that it's possible for one's belief to be justified (or his claim to know to be justified as you put it) even if the belief happens to be false and 2. that if it turns out that G was/has been mistaken about event E (borrowing your example), then G never actually held knowledge of event E (because even if the belief is justified, it's still the case that one simply cannot know a false proposition). So I agree with these claims. However, none of this is what I was trying to say to whitey before. There I was actually trying to say something about the distinction between fallibilism and infallibilism. I'll try to make my point more clearly here.

Generally, infallibilism is the thesis that knowing requires that one satisfies some infallibility condition. For instance, the infallibility condition may be one of entailing evidence. This sort of evidential infallibilism (EI) claims that one knows that P on the basis of evidence e only if e logically entails P (here, evidence is taken to be propositional because it is assumed to enter into logical relations; so, for instance, although it is common to talk of a bloodied knife itself as evidence, such evidence in this context would be the proposition that a bloodied knife was found in the defendant's car, or some such). So the infallibilist requires that knowledge is basically shrouded in certainty in some way. In EI the certainty of knowledge would come from the fact that the evidence is such that it guarantees the truth of P. Note that EI is a very strong condition, and it would lead straight to deep skepticism. For instance, whenever we come to hold beliefs on the basis of induction or abduction, the inference from e to P is not such that e logically entails P; hence under EI such beliefs cannot qualify as knowledge (so much for the scientific method!). There are other forms of infallibilism beside EI that I have seen, but I think most of them roughly claim S knows P on basis b only if it was not possible that S had b and P was false (where the modality here could be construed in terms of logical, metaphysical, or physical possibility).

So, before in my comments to whitey, what I was actually trying to say is that fallibilism is basically the denial of infallibilism. That is how I would like you to interpret my earlier statements. The problem arises: if I say something fallibilist like "knowing that P does not require that the belief could not be mistaken", that sounds ridiculous on some interpretations (for instance, one could interpret that as my saying that one could know P where P is in fact false, which is ridiculous). But if you interpret it in the context of that I am simply denying what the infallibilist claims, then it makes sense. I think this is related to what are called "concessive knowledge attributions". Concessive knowledge attributions are fallibilist statements that may seem ridiculous at the surface, and they would be of the form "S knows that P, but it is possible that Q" (where Q in fact entails not-P). But these statements should be interpreted with the proper "possibility" construal. For instance, this statement may just be expressing that the evidence does not entail that P (thus Q-type propositions are to that extent "possible" ), in which case the statement is simply a denial of EI. Or it could be a statement concerning a sort of epistemic possibility where we might say that it is possible (for S) that Q iff what S knows does not entail, in a manner that is obvious to S, not-P (where again Q is such that it entails not-P).

Point being, in my earlier comments I was just trying to express that fallibilism is the denial of infallibilism, and that it does not seem to me that merely fallible foreknowledge should threaten libertarian free will.

But, the theists claim for 3-O-G is that G’s “expectation” (or “belief” ) is infallible. That is, the claim is minimally that G’s (fore)knowledge of E will be confirmed ex post facto.

Right, but the latter also a minimal consideration for fallibilist (fore)knowledge (or just (fore)knowledge generally) as well (again, concessive knowledge attributions definitely should not be interpreted as saying that under fallibilist accounts one can know a proposition that turns out to be false). But your first point is well-taken: many theists do claim that God's (fore)knowledge is infallible. So we should ask the question of whether infallible foreknowledge threatens libertarian free will.

Actually, I think the claim needs to be stronger than that: I think it needs to (and undoubtedly does) entail that G knows that his (fore)knowledge is infallible. In a sense, G is omniscient with regard to G’s own omniscience.

I'm not seeing why this should be important, but I think this would be trivially satisfied given that an omniscient being would know all true propositions (including that he possesses infallible foreknowledge, if that happens to be a true proposition).

(1) G knows that S will A.

(2) Such knowledge on the part of G is infallible.

(3) G knows that such knowledge is infallible.

(4) S does not A.

—But, (4) results in a contradiction. I think that justifies:

(4&rsquo😉 It is necessary that S will do A.

(5), (6) and (7) follow your 3”, 4”, 5”.

First, as mentioned above, I'm not really seeing why (3) is needed (?). Also, how does this actually invoke in any material way the infallibility condition? It's also true simply under a fallibilist account that the conjuction of "G knows S will A" and "S does not (end up) A(-ing)" results in a contradiction (again, fallibilist statements such as concessive knowledge attributions don't imply otherwise). In other words, I am not seeing how this (1) through (4&rsquo😉 offers any more substance than simply

A. G (fallibly) knows that S will do A.
B. It is not the case that S will do A.
(but the conjunction of A & B results in contradiction)
C. So it is necessary that S will do A.

I thinks it's conceivable that the supposition of infallible foreknowledge could preclude libertarian free will, but I'm not sure how to correctly import the infallibility condition into the argument in a material way.

Originally posted by twhitehead
No. I currently do not think I have enough information to make that call. I do accept that it is entirely possible that we can never know everything.
As for the ultimate 'why' question, which is what I suspect you are trying to get at, I question the validity of the question more than the existence of an answer.
You say: Every answer to a why question w ...[text shortened]... jecting your worries on to me - even when I have repeatedly denied having any such concerns.

I do not say that every why question will invoke a bigger why only what I do say is this - a)every why question either invokes a bigger why OR b) an ultimate solution involving an IS that cannot be defined or explained but is ulimately boundless and eternal.

The choice is between an infinite regress of "whys" or a unexplainable why that is essentially inpenetrable and mysterious. My expereince is most thinkers such as yourself like to think that there is a final solution or "big why" that is not mysterious and is penetrable to rational explanation. The tendency is to feel uncomfortable with loose ends and mystery because admitting that existence is ultimately mysterious in nature would undermine your position and world view somewhat.

I am entirely comfortable with mystery and an uncaused , unexplainable "why" and see no reason why existence should be limited to a final solution where the buck finally stops. God infact is not really a solution as you might think because the mystery is endless.

Heaven for example is actually supposed to be a starting point to an eternity that never stops. Christian growth is supposed to continue infinitely in the next life and it never comes to an end , there is always more joy around the corner. Unimaginable that this may seem it is not really a "solution" because even in heaven there will always be new things to discover.

For me to see God as a "solution " is a mistake because it implies a finiteness to existence.
The God solution is really for me just the "best fit" to the question of existence. Infinite regress just seems dis-satisfactory in comparison. If you have concerns I think it might be that in considering the ultimate questions of existence you probably realise that the kind of rationality you base much of your thinking on starts to break down. You either get an infinite regress of causes , an uncaused cause , or maybe something out of zilch? Whatever we choose , rationality looks inadequate for the task of explaining it which is why for me it seems very rational to just accept the limitations of rationality as we know it and embrace the incredible mystery of it.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Thanks for all your comments. Sorry I haven't been able to reply readily, but I would like to keep the discussion rolling.

[b]B. My understanding of your comments to tw is that a person, G, need not hold a belief “in such a way that it could not be mistaken” in order for G to justifiably claim (fore)knowledge. (Am I correct there?)

[i]Howe port the infallibility condition into the argument in a material way.

[/b][/i]Thanks, LJ! There’s a bit for me to digest here, which will take some time, but I think I see where you’re coming from—the problem is that, as a layperson, I lack some of the formal philosophical context and lingo, which you have provided here.

On Wittgensteinian grounds, there are propositions such that, although they are not logically infallible, it would be epistemically destructive generally if I cannot say that I know them to be true. For example, “I did not have lunch in Peking yesterday.” If I have to add the phrase “I know”—as in “I know that I did not have lunch in Peking yesterday[/i]”—that redundancy would likely cause a listener to wonder why I felt the need to add it (could I be in any doubt?). What does it mean to say that I fallibly know that I did not have lunch in Peking yesterday? From your account, as I understand it, that would mean that there is no logical entailment that I must not have had lunch in Peking yesterday. Wittgenstein also raises the question of what empirical evidence could possibly influence my statement: if I do not trust my memory in such a case (with that short time-frame), why should I trust a set of flight schedules from here to Peking? If I am hallucinating about my continental whereabouts yesterday, I might just as well be hallucinating when I look at the flight schedules.

But, against the fallibist/infallibist context, I guess I see what you were saying.

With regard to my (3): you might be right about it’s not being necessary; however I am thinking along the lines of belief needing to be justified in order to be knowledge (i.e., other than a guess). Once one asserts infallible knowledge on the part of God (which I did), as a statement of God’s omniscience, it seems to me that God would not be omniscient if God thought that his own knowledge might be fallible. I’m not sure how omniscience can be defined in terms that allow for fallibility.

For example, can your “A. God knows (fallibly) that S will do A” be properly defined as omniscience? It would certainly seem to me to be a weaker form of omniscience than one in which God knows that his knowledge is not fallible.

Originally posted by knightmeister
If God eternally and infallibly knows that I do A, then I am, was and always will do A. -----Visted---

But the thing to appreciate here is that although you do do A and will do A , A still occurs because you choose A and will choose A . The fact that you will do A does not prove that A was the only thing you could have chosen at that point in time , ...[text shortened]... o God because he will always know that one choice you make at point T2 in time WHATEVER it is.

But what does the word “choose” mean here?

Suppose I am under a post-hypnotic suggestion such that every time you say the words “free will”, I speak the words “Of course!” Am I “choosing” to say those words or not? Suppose I confess that I do not know why I said those words? From my point of view, it certainly may seem that I chose to say them, even if I cannot say why.

So, instead of saying that if God knows that I will A, then I will A; I could simply say that if God knows that I will choose A, then I will choose A. If God’s knowledge is infallible, then I will never choose not-A. I ever chose not-A, then God’s “knowledge” would have been wrong.

How can this mean anything other than that God created me so that I would choose A in every case? If God created me so that I will in every case choose A, then ATY is correct, and my freedom to choose A or not-A is an illusion.

Originally posted by vistesd
But what does the word “choose” mean here?

Suppose I am under a post-hypnotic suggestion such that every time you say the words “free will”, I speak the words “Of course!” Am I “choosing” to say those words or not? Suppose I confess that I do not know why I said those words? From my point of view, it certainly may seem that I chose to say them, even if ...[text shortened]... in every case choose A, then ATY is correct, and my freedom to choose A or not-A is an illusion.

For me the idea that God knows what you "will" do is misleading because for God he knows what you "have" done in a sense. If you had your time machine in 1938 and met Hitler he might ask you "well , if you know what I will do then how am I free to do anything else?"

- You might respond by saying " Adolf , I have travelled to 1939 and watched you making that choice and also I have been to 2008 and looked back at your whole life , so for me it's not a question of what you will do but what you have done"

Adolf says - "But surely if you know that I will do A then how can I be free to do not A?"

You might respond by saying - " You were free to do not A or A in 1939 , I saw it happen and you chose A , you could have chosen not A but you didn't "

Free will cannot be proven in my opinion. What can be shown is that a free agent however fre he is can only make the choice A or not A but he cannot choose BOTH. Therefore , only one of these choices will actually exist. If the agent chooses not A then not A becomes God's knowledge and vice versa.

You will make a choice in 2009 , whether free or otherwise . If that choice is free or determined God will know it , - why?- because he's in 2009 already watching you do it. The hard bit is realising that in one sense God has to "wait" until you get to 2009 in order to know what you choose (because he knows nothing in advance) but at the same time 2009 is accessible to him in a way that it is not for you.

He knows right now if you have rejected Christ or not because for him you have already done it - he does not know it "in advance"

Originally posted by knightmeister
For me the idea that God knows what you "will" do is misleading because for God he knows what you "have" done in a sense. If you had your time machine in 1938 and met Hitler he might ask you "well , if you know what I will do then how am I free to do anything else?"

- You might respond by saying " Adolf , I have travelled to 1939 and watched you m ...[text shortened]... because for him you have already done it - he does not know it "in advance"

#1 - Time travel is impossible.
#2 - If it were possible, then by talking to Adolf you'd be changing history and would not know what Adolf was going to do because you've changed things.
#3 - The environment has an INCREDIBLE effect on our choices. God, by controlling so much of the environment, manipulates our choices indirectly if by no other way.
#4 - The hard bit is realising that in one sense God has to "wait" until you get to 2009 in order to know what you choose (because he knows nothing in advance) but at the same time 2009 is accessible to him in a way that it is not for you. - Make up your mind. Does God see things in temporal order or can he simply look at the whole timeline simultaneously like a single image or painting? The latter seems to be how many Christians explain God, but in that case, God knew about Hitler and why Hitler made his choices and what environmental and genetic factors informed those decisions when God gave Hitler his environment and genes. God knew these things as he was making the Sun, before humanity even existed, and he controlled all the environmental factors that affected every human's choices and he knew HOW those factors would alter decisions.