05 Dec 06
The whole concept of free will is very similar to the concept of democracy - it can never be perfect. Most democracies don't really let you chose the president, they let you choose between two possible candidates, or abstain.
With free will, we often face choices but do not know for sure the out come of those choices and are therefore not making a truly informed decision. We also have a very limited set of choices, especially when a choice is affected by somebody else's free will.
05 Dec 06
Originally posted by no1marauderIndeed , I am positing about an entity that is unproven you are quite right , however , the proposition that is being put is hypothetical .... "IF God exists and he is omniscient/omnipotent how can there be free will ?" If you want to discuss whether God exists or not thats a different argument. My problem with the parallel universe idea being suggested as a logically accepted premise or truth is that parallel universes were not part of the original hypothetical discussion/or proposition.
LMAO! Here you are positing some entity that exists "outside of time" but you have the gall to say this about other possible universes:
sorry , unproven premise alert!! We don't know that there is even one parallel universe , thus your argument is not based on logic but supposition.
Are you kidding????????
Thus, I am entitled to suppose that God exists for the sake of the debate. Scottishnz can suppose that parallel universes exist too , but he didn't suppose , he presented them as logically proven whereas I am not suggesting God is logically proven , I am hypothetically assuming he exists . If I didn't no debate would be possible!
05 Dec 06
Originally posted by twhiteheadThis is a statement rather than a reasoned argument. Do you have an argument to put forward or do you think that by repeating a statement it makes it true? For example , why does it "dictate" , you have yet to say!
The very existence of an entity outside of time capable of recording events taking place inside time dictates that predetermination is a fact. You can talk dimensions all you like it wont change that.
05 Dec 06
Originally posted by knightmeisterIt is a statement not an argument because it is based directly on the definition of predestination.
This is a statement rather than a reasoned argument. Do you have an argument to put forward or do you think that by repeating a statement it makes it true? For example , why does it "dictate" , you have yet to say!
The only possible loop hole I can see is that although your God is hypothesized outside time he clearly requires his own time line in order to function. For him to 'create' the universe obviously requires his own time line. For him to make a decision on whether or not to create the universe requires him to have his own time line. So maybe the answer to predestination is that God does not have his own time line and therefore is incapable of decision making separate to the universe and therefore did not make the decision to create the world and therefore cannot be held accountable!
Whatever the case, if God knew the full history of the earth at the 'time' when he made it then it is predestined by definition.
05 Dec 06
Originally posted by knightmeisterNot by any standard we can imagine, since most of us define "free will" as "the ability to take an action which cannot be predicted in advance" and "omniscent" as "knowing everything (which presumably includes being able to predict in advance exactly what will happen in the future)."
"IF God exists and he is omniscient/omnipotent how can there be free will ?"
Good luck reconciling conflicting statements made by different people at different times about an unknowable entity!
05 Dec 06
Originally posted by twhiteheadKnowing what will happen does take away the choice.
Knowing what will happen does take away the choice. Anything else is illogical. If God, by what ever means, knows what will happen in our future then we have no choice (free will) and predestination is fact.
What's this; another proof by assertion? Could you provide a coherent argument for how knowledge about action X is a sufficient cause for action X? Could it perhaps be something more rigorous and tenable than merely stating your unsubstantiated opinion?
05 Dec 06
Originally posted by HalitoseKnowledge about action X is not necessarily sufficient cause for action X. However that was not the intended claim, although my wording could be taken that way. Better would have been "knowing what will happen excludes the possibility of choice".
What's this; another proof by assertion? Could you provide a coherent argument for how knowledge about action X is a sufficient cause for action X? Could it perhaps be something more rigorous and tenable than merely stating your unsubstantiated opinion?
Certainly knowledge about action X does necessarily mean that no other actions are possible. Thus foreknowledge and choice cannot co-exist.
05 Dec 06
1 edit
Originally posted by twhiteheadBetter would have been "knowing what will happen excludes the possibility of choice".
Knowledge about action X is not necessarily sufficient cause for action X. However that was not the intended claim, although my wording could be taken that way. Better would have been "knowing what will happen excludes the possibility of choice".
Certainly knowledge about action X does necessarily mean that no other actions are possible. Thus foreknowledge and choice cannot co-exist.
Lets take a hypothetical situation here:
1) Moral Agent A will be faced with options X, Y and Z at time T.
2) Omniscient Agent B at time T - t manifests knowledge (K) that A will choose option X.
3) A chooses X at time T.
Does this mean that B forced A to choose X?
Does this mean that A didn't actually choose X?
All this shows is that B correctly predicted A’s choice. It's got nothing to do with A's ability to choose.
05 Dec 06
Originally posted by HalitoseOnly if the prediction was a lucky chance can you say that they are unrelated. If the prediction was guaranteed then A did not have a choice regardless of whether or not the moral agents knowledge had anything to do with it.
[b]Better would have been "knowing what will happen excludes the possibility of choice".
Lets take a hypothetical situation here:
1) Moral Agent A will be faced with options X, Y and Z at time T.
2) Omniscient Agent B at time T - t manifests knowledge (K) that A will choose option X.
...[text shortened]... ctly predicted A’s choice. It's got nothing to do with A's ability to choose.[/b]
05 Dec 06
1 edit
Originally posted by twhiteheadHuh?
Only if the prediction was a lucky chance can you say that they are unrelated. If the prediction was guaranteed then A did not have a choice regardless of whether or not the moral agents knowledge had anything to do with it.
Edit: So this is proof by assertion after all?
If the prediction was guaranteed then A did not have a choice...
Prove this. Asserting it ad nauseam does not constitute proof in my opinion.
05 Dec 06
Originally posted by HalitoseNot that I agree with it, but here is an argument that (I think) captures the point:
[b]Better would have been "knowing what will happen excludes the possibility of choice".
Lets take a hypothetical situation here:
1) Moral Agent A will be faced with options X, Y and Z at time T.
2) Omniscient Agent B at time T - t manifests knowledge (K) that A will choose option X.
...[text shortened]... ctly predicted A’s choice. It's got nothing to do with A's ability to choose.[/b]
1) Suppose God is omniscient.
2) Then, necessarily, God knows all true propositions.
3) The following proposition (P) is either true or false: "bbarr will make coffee at time T".
4) Suppose P is true.
5) Then, necessarily, God knows that bbarr will make coffee at time T.
6) Hence, it is logically impossible for it not to be the case that bbarr will make coffee at time T.
7) Hence, it is logically impossible for bbarr to choose not to make coffee at time T.
8) But if it is not within bbarr's power to choose not to make coffee at time T, then bbarr's choice to make coffee at time T is not truly free.
9) So, bbarr's choice to make coffee at time T is not truly free.
Then you just run the argument for any particular action, and you get the conclusion that no actions are truly free. Of course, if you are a theist and a compatibilist about free will you have nothing to fear from this argument.
05 Dec 06
Originally posted by HalitoseHow about this:
[b]Better would have been "knowing what will happen excludes the possibility of choice".
Lets take a hypothetical situation here:
1) Moral Agent A will be faced with options X, Y and Z at time T.
2) Omniscient Agent B at time T - t manifests knowledge (K) that A will choose option X.
...[text shortened]... ctly predicted A’s choice. It's got nothing to do with A's ability to choose.[/b]
God is said to have created man and given him free will. But what is free will? I claim that free will is the ability to take an action X such that the probability that I will take that action is not 100%. This means that there is always the chance that I will not act as predicted. The proof is this that if the probability that I take an action is 100%, then I am completely predictable -- a iving automaton. One would not argue that a clock or wind-up toy has free will.
So for me to truly have free will, in any given situation, there must be a chance that I will do X, and also a chance that I will not do X.
Therefore, no matter how small the probability and no matter how perfect God's knowledge, eventually, God will predict I will do X, and I will not do it. Hence God is not omniscent.
The only way for this not to be the case is that God's ability to predict my actions is perfect. But in that case, God has not truly granted free will. He has created an automaton whose every action is 100% predictable.
The argument of God stepping outside of time put's God in the role of the director of a film. He can run the film forward or backward, view and review. But in the end, all the actions in the film have been prespecified.
Therefore there is a logical contradiction between God being omniscent and having granted free will. But this is to be expected since both of these concepts are MAN's speculation about God -- not what God has revealed about himself.
06 Dec 06
Originally posted by HalitoseSo you are claiming that even though it has been predicted that A will do X at time T and the prediction is correct that A might still do Y or Z?
Huh?
Edit: So this is proof by assertion after all?
[b]If the prediction was guaranteed then A did not have a choice...
Prove this. Asserting it ad nauseam does not constitute proof in my opinion.[/b]
06 Dec 06
Originally posted by twhiteheadAnd it is precisely the idea that universe is absolutely predestined that I am challenging. Your argument is logical if you assume, without question , that the ONLY way God can know the future is that it is predestined to be that way .
It is a statement not an argument because it is based directly on the definition of predestination.
The only possible loop hole I can see is that although your God is hypothesized outside time he clearly requires his own time line in order to function. For him to 'create' the universe obviously requires his own time line. For him to make a decision on wh ...[text shortened]... ull history of the earth at the 'time' when he made it then it is predestined by definition.
HOWEVER , it is precisely this premise I dispute becuase I think an eternal being doesn't have to rely on pre destination to know the future , he can use his peculiar quality of being outside our timeline.
He may or may not have his own timeline and if he does it may look radically different from ours , but he would still be free of ours.