Spirituality
14 Feb 09
Originally posted by Agergthis is getting too brainy for me, is it not the case that time flows from the future to the present and on to the past, therefore our future is heading towards us at present, and thus we can influence the future by what we do in the present, for example if i jump off my house, its pretty sure than in the future i will end up in hospital, thus in a strange way i can determine the future, am i not infallible! i apologize for the simplistic nature of the illustration but its late and i am at meltdown stage.
You could claim it...I wouldn't believe it of course! 🙂
Though I would then argue (for the sake of it) that you know the state of [b]all relevent variables that would make it true you infallibly know you shall do X.[/b]
Originally posted by robbie carrobieBut you don't *know* you wll end up in hospital.
this is getting too brainy for me, is it not the case that time flows from the future to the present and on to the past, therefore our future is heading towards us at present, and thus we can influence the future by what we do in the present, for example if i jump off my house, its pretty sure than in the future i will end up in hospital, thus in a s ...[text shortened]... apologize for the simplistic nature of the illustration but its late and i am at meltdown stage.
To be pedantic, and this sort of discussion requires pedantry, you don't *infallibly* know that if you jump of a building you will hit the floor. For example, you can't be precisely 100% sure that say, a nuclear bomb will not detonate from within the building and vaporise you before impact.
Many things you are pretty damned sure you will do can be known only to that extent: -You are pretty damned sure- In no case do you know without at least the vanishingly small potential for error.
Originally posted by Agergmmm, your right, thats no good for my claims, im just a mortal after all this time!
But you don't *know* you wll end up in hospital.
To be pedantic, and this sort of discussion requires pedantry, you don't *infallibly* know that if you jump of a building you will hit the floor. For example, you don't infallibly *know* that a nuclear bomb will not detonate from within the building and vaporise you before impact.
Many things you are pretty ...[text shortened]... retty damned sure- In no case do you know without the vanishingly small potential for error.
Originally posted by AgergThat does not change anything. Whether it is uncertain knowledge or infallible knowledge, it is still knowledge.
But you are not infallible...You *infallibly* know precisely nothing about what you will do in your future.
And anyway, I should think that I do have an infallible knowledge about what actions I will make, at least in the near future. I know that I will post because I know my character. I know that I have a desire to post; I know that my desire will not change. I can prove it to you by posting.
And consider the converse. Imagine that an omniscient God, who knows all the present facts and who knows my character and will infallibly, did not know what I will do. That would mean that my action is not be governed by my character and will; that I act either not according to my own will or I act randomly.
Originally posted by Conrau KIt should be noted that knightmeister and Agerg sound like they hold a libertarian view of free will. Your view of free will sounds more like compatibilism.
That does not change anything. Whether it is uncertain knowledge or infallible knowledge, it is still knowledge.
And anyway, I should think that I do have an infallible knowledge about what actions I will make, at least in the near future. I know that I will post because I know my character. I know that I have a desire to post; I know that my desire wil ...[text shortened]... rned by my character and will; that I act either not according to my own will or I act randomly.
Originally posted by SwissGambitNot necessarily. A libertarian must still hold that their actions are the result of their own character. If otherwise, then free will does not make sense -- it would mean that for a person to act of their own free will they must act against their own will. Such an idea is self-negating.
It should be noted that knightmeister and Agerg sound like they hold a libertarian view of free will. Your view of free will sounds more like compatibilism.
Originally posted by Conrau K"And anyway, I should think that I do have an infallible knowledge about what actions I will make, at least in the near future. I know that I will post because I know my character. I know that I have a desire to post; I know that my desire will not change. I can prove it to you by posting. "
That does not change anything. Whether it is uncertain knowledge or infallible knowledge, it is still knowledge.
And anyway, I should think that I do have an infallible knowledge about what actions I will make, at least in the near future. I know that I will post because I know my character. I know that I have a desire to post; I know that my desire wil ...[text shortened]... rned by my character and will; that I act either not according to my own will or I act randomly.
Even that is not strictly accurate for you did not know at the point of making that assertion you would not say, suffer a stroke before making that post. You were quite sure you had no need to worry about it but that is not the same as having infallible knowledge.
Infallible knowledge is a very strong statement, and it must cover all cases.
If your god knows your character down to the very last variable, and he knows that the summation of all your experiences and the present circumstances acting upon you will compel you to make a certain decsision then to all intents and pruposes you have no free will. Only the illusion of it.
When I talk about free will I make a distinction between actual, dynamic, unpredictable choice, and pseudo or illusionary free-will.
For what its worth, independently of an all knowing God I am a determinist, (though I cannot be as sure of this as I am that omniscience and free-will is a logical contradiction)
Originally posted by AgergEven that is not strictly accurate for you did not know at the point of making that assertion you would not say, suffer a stroke before making that post. You were quite sure you had no need to worry about it but that is not the same as having infallible knowledge.
"And anyway, I should think that I do have an infallible knowledge about what actions I will make, at least in the near future. I know that I will post because I know my character. I know that I have a desire to post; I know that my desire will not change. I can prove it to you by posting. "
Even that is not strictly accurate for you did not know at the poi ...[text shortened]... I cannot be as sure of this as I am that omniscience and free-will is a logical contradiction)
Infallible knowledge is a very strong statement, and it must cover all cases.
But that type of knowledge does not matter. How could God's knowledge that I would not have a stroke impair my free will?
If your god knows your character down to the very last variable, and he knows that the summation of all your experiences and the present circumstances acting upon you will compel you to make a certain decsision then to all intents and pruposes you have no free will. Only the illusion of it.
Again, I don't see how God's knowledge impairs my free will. In this example, it is not His knowledge which would affect my action; it is the object of His knowledge (i.e. 'the summation of present circumstances'😉 which would affect my behaviour. Those circumstances exist whether or not God knows about them.
For what its worth, independently of an all knowing God I am a determinist, (though I cannot be as sure of this as I am that omniscience and free-will is a logical contradiction)
Well, I am a determinist, but I do not see that as incompatible with free will.
Originally posted by Conrau KWhen did making sense matter to knightmeister? In previous discussions with him he as failed completely to identify where the source of a free will act really is, he seemed torn between totally random events and God, but character never came into it - that sounds too deterministic for him.
If otherwise, then free will does not make sense -- it would mean that for a person to act of their own free will they must act against their own will. Such an idea is self-negating.
The potential stroke example was given to refute your claim of *your* infallible knowlege of the close future, not God's
If you believe in determinism Conrau then the argument is moot for your "free-will" is purely an illusion if you are correct.
If determinism is not correct, then an omniscient God would have to *infallibly* know by other means. Either by forecasting it witha absolute knowledge or having seen you do it in your future (from its perspective)
Either way you don't have strict libertarian free-will.
Originally posted by Agerg[b]The potential stroke example was given to refute your claim of *your* infallible knowlege of the close future, not God's[/b]
The potential stroke example was given to refute your claim of *your* infallible knowlege of the close future, not God's
If determinism is not correct, then an omniscient God would have to *infallibly* know by other means. Either by forecasting it witha absolute knowledge or having seen you do it in your future (from its perspective)
Either way you don't have strict libertarian free-will.
No. As I said before, knowledge of a stroke has nothing to do with free will. Your claim was that God's knowledge of how we will act precludes free will, not that knowledge of how other things may befall us (such as a stroke) precludes free will. Therefore, my similar, and likely very accurate, knowledge of how I will act should also preclude free will, should you be right.
If you believe in determinism Conrau then the argument is moot for your "free-will" is purely an illusion if you are correct.
I do not see this as an issue of determinism versus libertarianism. The issue is not whether free will requires that our will be without any causal antecedents but whether knowledge of the future preclude free will. I do not see how mere knowledge could do that.
If determinism is not correct, then an omniscient God would have to *infallibly* know by other means. Either by forecasting it witha absolute knowledge or having seen you do it in your future (from its perspective)
Yes, except that God could not forecast if determinism were untrue. You are still left however to explain how God's mere knowledge precludes free will.
Originally posted by twhiteheadYes. I do see his libertarian of free will is untenable. But I am on his side on this one. I do not see how foreknowledge, whether God's or mine, whether infallible or uncertain, could impinge on free will.
When did making sense matter to knightmeister? In previous discussions with him he as failed completely to identify where the source of a free will act really is, he seemed torn between totally random events and God, but character never came into it - that sounds too deterministic for him.
Originally posted by Conrau K"No. As I said before, knowledge of a stroke has nothing to do with free will. Your claim was that God's knowledge of how we will act precludes free will, not that knowledge of how other things may befall us (such as a stroke) precludes free will. Therefore, my similar, and likely very accurate, knowledge of how I will act should also preclude free will, should you be right."
[b][b]The potential stroke example was given to refute your claim of *your* infallible knowlege of the close future, not God's[/b]
No. As I said before, knowledge of a stroke has nothing to do with free will. Your claim was that God's knowledge of how we will act precludes free will, not that knowledge of how other things may befall us (such as a str untrue. You are still left however to explain how God's mere knowledge precludes free will.[/b]
You claimed you have infallible knowledge about the close future. I demonstrated how this is not true, I didn't invoke your God for that refutation as it was not required.
"I do not see this as an issue of determinism versus libertarianism. The issue is not whether free will requires that our will be without any causal antecedents but whether knowledge of the future preclude free will. I do not see how mere knowledge could do that"
If you *know* you will do X in the future then two things can happen:
a) You can do ¬X this contradicting you knowing you wouldd do X
b) You can do X.
If your knowledge is infallible then a) is not an option for it leads to contradiction therefore in all cases you will do precisely as you know you will do. You have no other choice.
"Yes, except that God could not forecast if determinism were untrue. You are still left however to explain how God's mere knowledge precludes free will."
Gods knowledge precludes it because again, it is assumed true that from our perspective, God knows what I have done. There is no branching structure of decisions for me because for all points in my future it is known what I shall do.
I have to do precisely what your God saw me do...the choices I make (at all times, even from birth or before) are only those that lead to what was seen by your God. My free will is illusionary.
Originally posted by AgergYou claimed you have infallible knowledge about the close future.
"No. As I said before, knowledge of a stroke has nothing to do with free will. Your claim was that God's knowledge of how we will act precludes free will, not that knowledge of how other things may befall us (such as a stroke) precludes free will. Therefore, my similar, and likely very accurate, knowledge of how I will act should also preclude free will, shoul ...[text shortened]... re) are only those that lead to what was seen by your God. My free will is illusionary.
Return to my original post. I certainly did not claim that; I claimed that I had an infallible knowledge of how I will act, not of what things may befall me. And as I explained earlier, I do not see how the latter knowledge could possibly affect free will. I do not have free will over strokes.
If your knowledge is infallible then a) is not an option for it leads to contradiction therefore in all cases you will do precisely as you know you will do. You have no other choice.
And, as I explained, that is nonsense. You are basically saying that I cannot choose NOT-X because I know I will choose X. That seems to me an affirmation of free will, that I a self-autonomous agent can decide my future, not a refutation of free will.
Gods knowledge precludes it because again, it is assumed true that from our perspective, God knows what I have done. There is no branching structure of decisions for me because for all points in my future it is known what I shall do.
Again. This just seems ridiculous. I know what I will do. God knows what I will do. Duh. I would expect that. Imagine if I or God did not know what I would do. I would have to be a crazed madman acting randomly, hardly a free-willing being.