Holy spirit

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]You claimed you have infallible knowledge about the close future.

Return to my original post. I certainly did not claim that; I claimed that I had an infallible knowledge of how I will act, not of what things may befall me. And as I explained earlier, I do not see how the latter knowledge could possibly affect free will. I do not have free will o ...[text shortened]... hat I would do. I would have to be a crazed madman acting randomly, hardly a free-willing being.[/b]

"Return to my original post. I certainly did not claim that; I claimed that I had an infallible knowledge of how I will act, not of what things may befall me. And as I explained earlier, I do not see how the latter knowledge could possibly affect free will. I do not have free will over strokes"
I do not wish to rephrase this argument 10 times before you get the point...'m moving on

"And, as I explained, that is nonsense. You are basically saying that I cannot choose NOT-X because I know I will choose X. That seems to me an affirmation of free will, that I a self-autonomous agent can decide my future, not a refutation of free will. "
No...it means you cannot choose otherwise.
If you infallibly know you're going to flay your own mother alive in the future then there is nothing you can do to prevent it.

"Again. This just seems ridiculous. I know what I will do. God knows what I will do. Duh. I would expect that. Imagine if I or God did not know what I would do. I would have to be a crazed madman acting randomly, hardly a free-willing being."
You don't (infallibly) know what you will do before you do it...from your perspective it may feel like free will but if it is known you will doX in the future then in actuality it isn't free-will in the libertarian sense.

Originally posted by Conrau K
The issue is not whether free will requires that our will be without any causal antecedents but whether knowledge of the future preclude free will. I do not see how mere knowledge could do that.

For me the issue is whether or not the future is in some way fixed. It is not the knowledge of the future that causes the problem but rather the fact that knowledge of the future can exist.
1. It tells us that the future is fixed.
2. It creates time paradoxes in that telling us about the future changes the future being told resulting in recursion.

Originally posted by twhitehead
For me the issue is whether or not the future is in some way fixed. It is not the knowledge of the future that causes the problem but rather the fact that knowledge of the future can exist.
1. It tells us that the future is fixed.
2. It creates time paradoxes in that telling us about the future changes the future being told resulting in recursion.

For me the issue is whether or not the future is in some way fixed.
If, by 'fixed,' you mean 'set,' then yes, the future is 'fixed.' Because of the nature of man's limited knowledge, he is only able to see things clearly in retrospect--- and even the past isn't always analyzed correctly.

God has no such limitations. For Him, the future is as perspicuous as the past. His perfect knowledge of the past does not change any action of any agent. Neither does His knowledge of the future change any action of any agent in that arena.

At his most intuitive, man has been fairly competent at predicting future scenarios based on today's activities. His ability to do so in no way alters the free will actions of tomorrow's agents (although some may adjust their decisions based upon their trust in the human prognasticators).

At every single step of prophetic fulfillment, there has been zero indication that the free will of the agents involved was in any way manipulated.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]If, by 'fixed,' you mean 'set,' then yes, the future is 'fixed.' /b]

So if it is fixed that tomorrow I will do A, then is it a free will choice that I make when I choose to do A? What do you mean by 'free will' in this case?

I see you have avoided my 2. just like knightmeister does. I guess you think it will simply go away.

Originally posted by twhitehead
So if it is fixed that tomorrow I will do A, then is it a free will choice that I make when I choose to do A? What do you mean by 'free will' in this case?

I see you have avoided my 2. just like knightmeister does. I guess you think it will simply go away.

So if it is fixed that tomorrow I will do A, then is it a free will choice that I make when I choose to do A?
Yes. Just as your actions yesterday are now--- by your perspective--- fixed but free, your future thoughts and actions are also fixed but free.

What do you mean by 'free will' in this case?
The control that rational agents, i.e., man, exercise over their decisions and actions.

I see you have avoided my 2. just like knightmeister does. I guess you think it will simply go away.
I suppose I don’t see recursion as a bad thing, at least with respect to causing any insurmountable obstacles. Where do you see the problem occurring, exactly?

Originally posted by Conrau K
Yes. I do see his libertarian of free will is untenable. But I am on his side on this one. I do not see how foreknowledge, whether God's or mine, whether infallible or uncertain, could impinge on free will.

His argument is that libertarian free will is still possible even though there is a being [God] with infallible knowledge of the future. Are you sure you're on his side?

Originally posted by robbie carrobie
that would naturally exclude me, sorry for the inconvenience, try some of the born againers, they might explain why you will be toast, as for me, i hold that a God of love would never torment anyone for mistakes made while in a sinful condition, as for sinning against the holy spirit, it simply means that you will not be given the chance of a resurre ...[text shortened]... thus you will remain dead forever, experiencing nothing, no pain, no torture, just nothingness!

1. Oblivion can be good, so long as you're dressed for it; and
2. What do you mean when you use the word "sin?" Give my some synonyms, if you will pardon the expression.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]For me the issue is whether or not the future is in some way fixed.
If, by 'fixed,' you mean 'set,' then yes, the future is 'fixed.' Because of the nature of man's limited knowledge, he is only able to see things clearly in retrospect--- and even the past isn't always analyzed correctly.

God has no such limitations. For Him, the future is as p zero indication that the free will of the agents involved was in any way manipulated.[/b]

How is it you have knowledge of this? Where are these facts for us to examine?

I only ask so I can look ahead and see when this @#!%$% market is going to bottom out.

I knew I should have sold and got out when it hit 14,000. Not trusting my own judgment, I had "faith" in my broker's judgment as surely he knew more about these things than I did.

Well, now we're down by half and I will have to work until I die rather than retire and travel to Italy, etc.

If I had tomorrow or next week or next months' financial pages, I might be able to fix all this.

Since the future is "fixed" that ought to be possible .... hmmmmm?

Originally posted by twhitehead
For me the issue is whether or not the future is in some way fixed. It is not the knowledge of the future that causes the problem but rather the fact that knowledge of the future can exist.
1. It tells us that the future is fixed.
2. It creates time paradoxes in that telling us about the future changes the future being told resulting in recursion.

It isn't just "for me." It either is or isn't for eveyone and anyone.

What about Heisenberg's uncertainty principle?

How do you sqaure all this with the proposition that even observing the universe changes it? How can things be "fixed" and can you give me the math on that?

The nearest analog to what you appear to say, as well as others here, in support of a "fixed" future would be Fred Hoyle's "Steady State" theory, which has been thoroughly picked to pieces and discarded mathematically and empirically.

Or are we simply to "believe?" In which case, how do I distinguish what anyone says here or from a pulpit from the Sci-Fi channel theory of everything, or even from Douglas Adams' ideas? Rather miss old Doug.

Heisenberg gave us the equations for his idea in 1927. So far, they hold up. how about your numbers?

Originally posted by twhitehead
1. It tells us that the future is fixed.
2. It creates time paradoxes in that telling us about the future changes the future being told resulting in recursion.

I don't see how God's mere knowledge fixes it. It is fixed because I fix it. I make the choice and so I am bound to act out the choice I make. God's knowledge is not forcing me.

Originally posted by SwissGambit
His argument is that [b]libertarian free will is still possible even though there is a being [God] with infallible knowledge of the future. Are you sure you're on his side?[/b]

What is this thing you call "the future" ? Surely "the future" depends on your standpoint. From a 1901 perspective 1945 is "the future" , why is your particular place in time more important than others?

Originally posted by SwissGambit
His argument is that [b]libertarian free will is still possible even though there is a being [God] with infallible knowledge of the future. Are you sure you're on his side?[/b]

I think libertarianism, as he defines it, is untenable. But I am on his side that God's knowledge does not preclude free will, even if libertarian.

Originally posted by twhitehead
For me the issue is whether or not the future is in some way fixed. It is not the knowledge of the future that causes the problem but rather the fact that knowledge of the future can exist.
1. It tells us that the future is fixed.
2. It creates time paradoxes in that telling us about the future changes the future being told resulting in recursion.

But what fixes it? Determinism or free choices?

Originally posted by Agerg
"Return to my original post. I certainly did not claim that; I claimed that I had an infallible knowledge of how I will act, not of what things may befall me. And as I explained earlier, I do not see how the latter knowledge could possibly affect free will. I do not have free will over strokes"
I do not wish to rephrase this argument 10 times before you get t will doX in the future then in actuality it isn't free-will in the libertarian sense.

I do not wish to rephrase this argument 10 times before you get the point...'m moving on


Hay, you misrepresented what I said. I did not say that I had an infallible knowledge of the future and I do not see how knowledge of a stroke could affect free will. The only relevant knowledge to this discussion is the foreknowledge of future acts. And I do have an infallible knowledge of how I will act.

No...it means you [b]cannot choose otherwise.
If you infallibly know you're going to flay your own mother alive in the future then there is nothing you can do to prevent it.[/b]

Yes, I know. You don't need to keep repeating yourself. I understand your argument. I just think it shows an incoherent view of free will. Obviously I cannot choose otherwise. If I have chosen to kill my mother, I cannot later to go to court and argue "I didn't have free will! I had made the choice to kill my mother and so, I could no longer choose not to kill her." It's bizarre. If I will choose X, then I cannot choose not-X. Choice of one excludes choice of the other. It is not God's knowledge which make it that way.

You don't (infallibly) know what you will do before you do it...from your perspective it may feel like free will but if it is known you will doX in the future then in actuality it isn't free-will in the libertarian sense.

Not at all. A libertarian must still hold that their actions are the direct result of their will and character. Their actions do not occur randomly but predictably. And of course I should know how I will act, given that I know myself intimately.

Originally posted by knightmeister
What is this thing you call "the future" ? Surely "the future" depends on your standpoint. From a 1901 perspective 1945 is "the future" , why is your particular place in time more important than others?

Is there anyone here now to give us their perspective from 1901?

Surely we know how to use the word "future." We do not use the word in the context you frame. I did not see anyone say this point in time -- which is of course entirely arbitrary -- is more "important" than another. Is not our perception of time, while we have the ability to use the verb "to perceive," fixed? What we have perceived, what we perceive now is fixed. What may happen four, no, three minutes from now at 5 pm EST where I am may be subject to some variables and I'm not sure of all of those so I can't say with absolute certainty that here at 4:57 pm EST things at 5:00 pm EST also are fixed.

After all, I could sneeze, or maybe not.