26 Nov 06
3 edits
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesYou probably don't want to deny that propositions about the future have truth values, else notions like validity wouldn't apply to inferences from propositions about the future. Also, denying that propositions about the future have truth values entails that you can't know propositions about the future. But this is absurd. I know that on Monday all my students will show up clothed. Further, it would be bizarre if necessary truths lacked truth values when appended to temporal indexicals (e.g., "tomorrow everything will be identical with itself" ). I haven't seen any good arguments for the claim that this entails determinism. Determinism is generally considered a thesis about causation; that the way things are at some particular time fix the way the future will be. But the denial of determinism is consistent with the propositions about the future having truth values. For instance, even if even E randomly occurs at time T1, it would still be the case that at T0 the proposition 'E will occur at T1' is true.
I don't know. Ask bbarr. He already said he'd give some remarks about theories of knowledge and the relationship between propositions and reality, in light of how badly the topic was presented in the CRISIS Magazine article I cited a couple weeks ago.
I suppose if I stick by my above remarks that all propositions have exactly one truth value, th ...[text shortened]... s the case even when formulating the proposition within some sort of temporal logic framework.
27 Nov 06
Originally posted by bbarrwell it either will or it won't, which sounds more like 50/50 to me....
You probably don't want to deny that propositions about the future have truth values, else notions like validity wouldn't apply to inferences from propositions about the future. Also, denying that propositions about the future have truth values entails that you can't know propositions about the future. But this is absurd. I know that on Monday all my studen ...[text shortened]... T1, it would still be the case that at T0 the proposition 'E will occur at T1' is true.
27 Nov 06
5 edits
Originally posted by bbarrI remain unconvinced.
For instance, even if even E randomly occurs at time T1, it would still be the case that at T0 the proposition 'E will occur at T1' is true.
If at T0 that proposition is true, then it is logically impossible for E to not occur at T1 once T0 passes (because such non-occurrence would contradict a true proposition, a logical impossibility). But if it is logically impossible for E to not occur, I don't see how the occurrence of E can be characterized as random; it is a necessary occurrence, at least once T0 passes with the proposition being true at that instant.
Said a different way, if some event E occurs randomly at time T, then at any time prior to T, it is not the case the E will occur, nor is it the case that E will not occur; there is no case at all if E is random. If there were a case, E could not be random, as it would be logically constrained to occur in accordance with that case, with no logically possible alternatives.
An event that is logically constrained to only one possible outcome is not one that I'm comfortable calling random.
27 Nov 06
1 edit
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesEdit: I'll wait until you're finished editing.
I remain unconvinced.
If at T0 that proposition is true, then it is logically impossible for E to not occur at T1 once T0 passes (because such non-occurrence would contradict a true proposition, a logical impossibility). But if it is logically impossible for E to not occur, I don't see how the occurrence of E can be charaterized as random; it i ...[text shortened]... necessary occurrence, at least once T0 passes with the proposition being true at that instant.
27 Nov 06
1 edit
Originally posted by EcstremeVenomI don't understand why people always mock me for copious edits.
lol
Besides, a man who knows that his students will appear clothed in the morning should also know I'd need at least 5 edits. After all, it was true yesterday that I would, even before I exercised my free will today to engage in this discussion.
27 Nov 06
Said a different way, if some event E occurs randomly at time T, then at any time prior to T, it is not the case the E will occur, nor is it the case that E will not occur; there is no case at all if E is random. If there were a case, E could not be random, as it would be logically constrained to occur in accordance with that case, with no logically possible alternatives.If at T0 that proposition is true, then it is logically impossible for E to not occur at T1 once T0 passes (because such non-occurrence would contradict a true proposition, a logical impossibility).
An event that is lo ...[text shortened]... ically constrained to only one possible outcome is not one that I'm comfortable calling random.[/b]
Right.
But if it is logically impossible for E to not occur, I don't see how the occurrence of E can be characterized as random...
E could be random if there are not causal antecedents sufficient to bring about E. Remember, we are not claiming that E is itself a necessary event, but rather that if the proposition "E will occur.." is true, then E must, of necessity, occur. The necessity of E is contingent upon the truth of the proposition, and this leaves it open whether E is caused or uncaused (i.e., random).
27 Nov 06
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesof course, but what if it was yesterday? would you have known? are you saying you know whats going to happen before it happens?
I don't understand why people always mock me for copious edits.
Besides, a man who knows that his students will appear clothed in the morning should also know I'd need at least 5 edits. After all, it was true yesterday that I would, even before I exercised my free will today to engage in this discussion.
27 Nov 06
5 edits
Originally posted by bbarrSuppose at T0 there are not causal antecedents sufficent to bring about E.
E could be random if there are not causal antecedents sufficient to bring about E.
At T0, why does the proposition have the value 'true'? If it has that value, what is it saying is the case in the universe? For example, the true proposition "The Sun exists" says that it is the case that there is a sun in the universe; it distinguishes our universe from any conceivable one that has no sun.
But how does the truth of the proposition at hand distinguish our universe from any other conceivable universe at T0? That is, given two universes that at the instant T1 differ only in that E has just occurred in one and not the other, and that were in all regards identical prior to T1, does it mean anything for a proposition about a future random event to be true or false prior to the time of the event? Wouldn't you say that those truth values only take on meaning subsequent to T1? Prior to T1, would you characterize the truth values as information?
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27 Nov 06
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesWhere's the spirituality in this?
Suppose at T0 there are not causal antecedents sufficent to bring about E.
At T0, why does the proposition have the value 'true'? If it has that value, what is it saying is the case in the universe? For example, the true proposition "The Sun exists" says that it is the case that there is a sun in the universe; it distinguishes our universe fro ...[text shortened]... T1? Prior to T1, would you characterize the truth values as information?
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27 Nov 06
3 edits
Originally posted by kirksey957Jesus Christ, Reverend, wouldn't you say it's pretty damn hard to wrap your God-given mind around this stuff? It is for me. I'm saying a prayer of thanks that I have bbarr to use as my virtual Tree of Knowledge whenever I'm feeling a little sinful and in the mood to consume some fruit that will help me to better understand the universe.
Where's the spirituality in this?
27 Nov 06
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesHell, I'm as lost with this as I am with RBHill. That's pretty damn lost.
Jesus Christ, Reverend, wouldn't you say it's pretty damn hard to wrap your God-given mind around this stuff? It is for me. I'm saying a prayer of thanks that I have bbarr to use as my virtual Tree of Knowledge whenever I'm feeling a little sinful and wish to better understand the universe.