27 Nov 06
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesAt T0 the proposition is true because at T1 there will be facts that make the proposition true. Of course, if E really is random then we couldn't come to know at T0 the proposition 'E will occur at T1', but that shouldn't be worrying. There are any number of propositions that are true but that cannot be known by anyone.
Suppose at T0 there are not causal antecedents sufficent to bring about E.
At T0, why does the proposition have the value 'true'? If it has that value, what is it saying is the case in the universe? For example, the true proposition "The Sun exists" says that it is the case that there is a sun in the universe; it distinguishes our universe fro ...[text shortened]... T1? Prior to T1, would you characterize the truth values as information?
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27 Nov 06
2 edits
Originally posted by bbarrI'm cool with that. That's not the aspect that troubles me.
Of course, if E really is random then we couldn't come to know at T0 the proposition 'E will occur at T1', but that shouldn't be worrying. There are any number of propositions that are true but that cannot be known by anyone.
What troubles me is that there is nothing in the universe at T0 conferring truth upon the proposition. As you say, "there will be facts" to make it true, but those facts are not manifest at T0. As soon as those facts manifest, I obviously have no problem with them making the propostion true, but I don't see how they can make it true before they even exist.
So, it seems as if truth is just a conventional notion, not a real aspect of the universe, if truth is something that can be conferred without presently manifest facts.
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27 Nov 06
Originally posted by bbarrSo effectively this shows that logic is incomplete? That there are true statements that cannot be shown to be true within logic?
At T0 the proposition is true because at T1 there will be facts that make the proposition true. Of course, if E really is random then we couldn't come to know at T0 the proposition 'E will occur at T1', but that shouldn't be worrying. There are any number of propositions that are true but that cannot be known by anyone.
27 Nov 06
1 edit
Originally posted by XanthosNZNo, logic deals with the implicative relationships between propositions, not on whether any particular contingent proposition is actually true. Logic is complete if every theorem can proved from the null set of hypotheses via correct application of the rules. But this is consistent with there being both contingent propositions that we couldn't understand (and hence couldn't believe, and hence couldn't know), and theorems that are so long and convoluted that we couldn't hold them in mind well enough to believe them. Further, there are contingent propositions that obviously have truth values but that nobody is in an epistemic position to know. Presumably, there is an instance of some proposition like "Alexander had ( # ) of hairs on his head" that is true when you replace the variable with the proper number, but that nobody could know because nobody could be justified in believing that instance rather than some other instance with a different number replacing the variable.
So effectively this shows that logic is incomplete? That there are true statements that cannot be shown to be true within logic?
27 Nov 06
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesSo, be a disquotationalist about truth, or some other sort of minimalist, and reject the claim that true propositions require facts to which they correspond and that make them true. Alternatively, endorse abstract facts, like the fact that at T0 the world is such that at T1 the world will be such that E will occur. There are any number of ways to get around this worry, depending on how spare or profligate you prefer your metaphysics.
I'm cool with that. That's not the aspect that troubles me.
What troubles me is that there is nothing in the universe at T0 conferring truth upon the proposition. As you say, "there will be facts" to make it true, but those facts are not manifest at T0. As soon as those facts manifest, I obviously have no problem with them making the proposti ...[text shortened]... hing that can be conferred without presently manifest facts.
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27 Nov 06
I do not believe that we can predict the future to the extent that we can claim a proposition about the future is true at the present time. However once the future has occurred, we can know whether or not the proposition was true. We can only give probabilities about the future. There is always a small chance that what we think is certain to occur will not occur. However as that chance is often extremely minuscule we say that something is true and even bet our lives on it.
27 Nov 06
1 edit
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf there is pure randomness then obviously they can't make it true before they exist or the randomness is resolved. Only under a determinist view of the universe would your problem exist.
As soon as those facts manifest, I obviously have no problem with them making the propostion true, but I don't see how they can make it true before they even exist.
27 Nov 06
Originally posted by bbarrFair enough.
No, logic deals with the implicative relationships between propositions, not on whether any particular contingent proposition is actually true. Logic is complete if every theorem can proved from the null set of hypotheses via correct application of the rules. But this is consistent with there being both contingent propositions that we couldn't understand (a ...[text shortened]... t instance rather than some other instance with a different number replacing the variable.
27 Nov 06
4 edits
Originally posted by bbarrCan I consistently adhere to both this notion of truth and a multiverse world view, in which random events are realized by the cleaving of one universe into multiple copies differing only in the outcome of the event?
Alternatively, endorse abstract facts, like the fact that at T0 the world is such that at T1 the world will be such that E will occur.
In the multiverse view, it seems that the world at T0 is such that it will yield at T1 a world in which the proposition is true, and a world in which it is false, so it would not be meaningful to say at T0 that at T1 the world is such that E will occur. If this were denoted as 'true' in the multiverse view, then all well-behaved propositions (i.e., no logical contradictions, no self-reference, etc.) about the future would be true, since the realization of the facts making it true in some future world is sufficient to make it true at all prior times in the parent world.